A New Era of macOS Sandbox Escapes: Diving into an Overlooked Attack Surface and Uncovering 10+ New Vulnerabilities
This is a blog post for my presentation at the conference POC2024. The slides are uploaded here.
In the macOS system, most processes are running in a restricted sandbox environment, whether they are Apple’s own services or third-party applications. Consequently, once an attacker gains Remote Code Execution (RCE) from these processes, their capabilities are constrained. The next step for the attacker is to circumvent the sandbox to gain enhanced execution capabilities and broader file access permissions.
But how to discover sandbox escape vulnerabilities? Upon reviewing the existing issues, I unearthed a significant overlooked attack surface and a novel attack technique. This led to the discovery of multiple new sandbox escape vulnerabilities: CVE-2023-27944, CVE-2023-32414, CVE-2023-32404, CVE-2023-41077, CVE-2023-42961, CVE-2024-27864, CVE-2023-42977, and more.
Since mid-April 2024, Microsoft has observed an increase in defense evasion tactics used in campaigns abusing file hosting services like SharePoint, OneDrive, and Dropbox. These campaigns use sophisticated techniques to perform social engineering, evade detection, and compromise identities, and include business email compromise (BEC) attacks.
The Binarly REsearch team has consistently uncovered security vulnerabilities in the Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) firmware -- a critical component of modern data center infrastructure. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely by threat actors, posing significant risk to enterprises.
In a previous report, “Old But Gold: The Underestimated Potency of Decades-Old Attacks on BMC Security,” we documented the BMC architecture in detail and showed that it is still possible to find classes of vulnerabilities known from the early 2000s.
Since late 2022, Earth Baku has broadened its scope from the Indo-Pacific region to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Their latest operations demonstrate sophisticated techniques, such as exploiting public-facing applications like IIS servers for initial access and deploying the Godzilla webshell for command and control.
In this post we will explore some of the anti-phishing measures employed by Microsoft 365 (formally Office 365) as well as their weaknesses. Certitude was able to identify an issue in that allows malicious actors to bypass anti-phishing measures.
To attract users across the Global Majority, many technology companies have introduced “lite” versions of their products: Applications that are designed for lower-bandwidth contexts. TikTok is no exception, with TikTok Lite estimated to have more than 1 billion users.
Mozilla and AI Forensics research reveals that TikTok Lite doesn’t just reduce required bandwidth, however. In our opinion, it also reduces trust and safety. In comparing TikTok Lite with the classic TikTok app, we found several discrepancies between trust and safety features that could have potentially dangerous consequences in the context of elections and public health.
Our research revealed TikTok Lite lacks basic protections that are afforded to other TikTok users, including content labels for graphic, AI-generated, misinformation, and dangerous acts videos. TikTok Lite users also encounter arbitrarily shortened video descriptions that can easily eliminate crucial context.
Further, TikTok Lite users have fewer proactive controls at their disposal. Unlike traditional TikTok users, they cannot filter offensive keywords or implement screen management practices.
Our findings are concerning, and reinforce patterns of double-standard. Technology platforms have a history of neglecting users outside of the US and EU, where there is markedly less potential for constraining regulation and enforcement. As part of our research, we discuss the implications of this pattern and also offer concrete recommendations for TikTok Lite to improve.
Sekoia.io investigated the mysterious 7777 botnet (aka. Quad7 botnet), published by the independent researcher Gi7w0rm inside the “The curious case of the 7777 botnet” blogpost.
This investigation allowed us to intercept network communications and malware deployed on a TP-Link router compromised by the Quad7 botnet in France.
To our understanding, the Quad7 botnet operators leverage compromised TP-Link routers to relay password spraying attacks against Microsoft 365 accounts without any specific targeting.
Therefore, we link the Quad7 botnet activity to possible long term business email compromise (BEC) cybercriminal activity rather than an APT threat actor.
However, certain mysteries remain regarding the exploits used to compromise the routers, the geographical distribution of the botnet and the attribution of this activity cluster to a specific threat actor.
The insecure architecture of this botnet led us to think that it can be hijacked by other threat actors to install their own implants on the compromised TP-Link routers by using the Quad7 botnet accesses.
Secure and private AI processing in the cloud poses a formidable new challenge. To support advanced features of Apple Intelligence with larger foundation models, we created Private Cloud Compute (PCC), a groundbreaking cloud intelligence system designed specifically for private AI processing. Built with custom Apple silicon and a hardened operating system, Private Cloud Compute extends the industry-leading security and privacy of Apple devices into the cloud, making sure that personal user data sent to PCC isn’t accessible to anyone other than the user — not even to Apple. We believe Private Cloud Compute is the most advanced security architecture ever deployed for cloud AI compute at scale.