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Hier - August 31, 2025

OpenAI Says It's Scanning Users' ChatGPT Conversations and Reporting Content to the Police

futurism.com Aug 27, 5:05 PM EDT by Noor Al-Sibai

OpenAI has authorized itself to call law enforcement if users say threatening enough things when talking to ChatGPT.

Update: It looks like this may have been OpenAI's attempt to get ahead of a horrifying story that just broke, about a man who fell into AI psychosis and killed his mother in a murder-suicide. Full details here.

For the better part of a year, we've watched — and reported — in horror as more and more stories emerge about AI chatbots leading people to self-harm, delusions, hospitalization, arrest, and suicide.

As the loved ones of the people impacted by these dangerous bots rally for change to prevent such harm from happening to anyone else, the companies that run these AIs have been slow to implement safeguards — and OpenAI, whose ChatGPT has been repeatedly implicated in what experts are now calling "AI psychosis," has until recently done little more than offer copy-pasted promises.

In a new blog post admitting certain failures amid its users' mental health crises, OpenAI also quietly disclosed that it's now scanning users' messages for certain types of harmful content, escalating particularly worrying content to human staff for review — and, in some cases, reporting it to the cops.

"When we detect users who are planning to harm others, we route their conversations to specialized pipelines where they are reviewed by a small team trained on our usage policies and who are authorized to take action, including banning accounts," the blog post notes. "If human reviewers determine that a case involves an imminent threat of serious physical harm to others, we may refer it to law enforcement."

That short and vague statement leaves a lot to be desired — and OpenAI's usage policies, referenced as the basis on which the human review team operates, don't provide much more clarity.

When describing its rule against "harm [to] yourself or others," the company listed off some pretty standard examples of prohibited activity, including using ChatGPT "to promote suicide or self-harm, develop or use weapons, injure others or destroy property, or engage in unauthorized activities that violate the security of any service or system."

But in the post warning users that the company will call the authorities if they seem like they're going to hurt someone, OpenAI also acknowledged that it is "currently not referring self-harm cases to law enforcement to respect people’s privacy given the uniquely private nature of ChatGPT interactions."

While ChatGPT has in the past proven itself pretty susceptible to so-called jailbreaks that trick it into spitting out instructions to build neurotoxins or step-by-step instructions to kill yourself, this new rule adds an additional layer of confusion. It remains unclear which exact types of chats could result in user conversations being flagged for human review, much less getting referred to police. We've reached out to OpenAI to ask for clarity.

While it's certainly a relief that AI conversations won't result in police wellness checks — which often end up causing more harm to the person in crisis due to most cops' complete lack of training in handling mental health situations — it's also kind of bizarre that OpenAI even mentions privacy, given that it admitted in the same post that it's monitoring user chats and potentially sharing them with the fuzz.

To make the announcement all the weirder, this new rule seems to contradict the company's pro-privacy stance amid its ongoing lawsuit with the New York Times and other publishers as they seek access to troves of ChatGPT logs to determine whether any of their copyrighted data had been used to train its models.

OpenAI has steadfastly rejected the publishers' request on grounds of protecting user privacy and has, more recently, begun trying to limit the amount of user chats it has to give the plaintiffs.

Last month, the company's CEO Sam Altman admitted during an appearance on a podcast that using ChatGPT as a therapist or attorney doesn't confer the same confidentiality that talking to a flesh-and-blood professional would — and that thanks to the NYT lawsuit, the company may be forced to turn those chats over to courts.

In other words, OpenAI is stuck between a rock and a hard place. The PR blowback from its users spiraling into mental health crises and dying by suicide is appalling — but since it's clearly having trouble controlling its own tech enough to protect users from those harmful scenarios, it's falling back on heavy-handed moderation that flies in the face of its own CEO's promises.

Amazon disrupts watering hole campaign by Russia’s APT29

aws.amazon.com by CJ Moses on 29 AUG 2025
Amazon’s threat intelligence team has identified and disrupted a watering hole campaign conducted by APT29 (also known as Midnight Blizzard), a threat actor associated with Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Our investigation uncovered an opportunistic watering hole campaign using compromised websites to redirect visitors to malicious infrastructure designed to trick users into authorizing attacker-controlled devices through Microsoft’s device code authentication flow. This opportunistic approach illustrates APT29’s continued evolution in scaling their operations to cast a wider net in their intelligence collection efforts.

The evolving tactics of APT29
This campaign follows a pattern of activity we’ve previously observed from APT29. In October 2024, Amazon disrupted APT29’s attempt to use domains impersonating AWS to phish users with Remote Desktop Protocol files pointed to actor-controlled resources. Also, in June 2025, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group reported on APT29’s phishing campaigns targeting academics and critics of Russia using application-specific passwords (ASPs). The current campaign shows their continued focus on credential harvesting and intelligence collection, with refinements to their technical approach, and demonstrates an evolution in APT29’s tradecraft through their ability to:

Compromise legitimate websites and initially inject obfuscated JavaScript
Rapidly adapt infrastructure when faced with disruption
On new infrastructure, adjust from use of JavaScript redirects to server-side redirects
Technical details
Amazon identified the activity through an analytic it created for APT29 infrastructure, which led to the discovery of the actor-controlled domain names. Through further investigation, Amazon identified the actor compromised various legitimate websites and injected JavaScript that redirected approximately 10% of visitors to these actor-controlled domains. These domains, including findcloudflare[.]com, mimicked Cloudflare verification pages to appear legitimate. The campaign’s ultimate target was Microsoft’s device code authentication flow. There was no compromise of AWS systems, nor was there a direct impact observed on AWS services or infrastructure.

Analysis of the code revealed evasion techniques, including:

Using randomization to only redirect a small percentage of visitors
Employing base64 encoding to hide malicious code
Setting cookies to prevent repeated redirects of the same visitor
Pivoting to new infrastructure when blocked
Image of compromised page, with domain name removed.
Image of compromised page, with domain name removed.

Amazon’s disruption efforts
Amazon remains committed to protecting the security of the internet by actively hunting for and disrupting sophisticated threat actors. We will continue working with industry partners and the security community to share intelligence and mitigate threats. Upon discovering this campaign, Amazon worked quickly to isolate affected EC2 instances, partner with Cloudflare and other providers to disrupt the actor’s domains, and share relevant information with Microsoft.

Despite the actor’s attempts to migrate to new infrastructure, including a move off AWS to another cloud provider, our team continued tracking and disrupting their operations. After our intervention, we observed the actor register additional domains such as cloudflare[.]redirectpartners[.]com, which again attempted to lure victims into Microsoft device code authentication workflows.

Protecting users and organizations
We recommend organizations implement the following protective measures:

For end users:

Be vigilant for suspicious redirect chains, particularly those masquerading as security verification pages.
Always verify the authenticity of device authorization requests before approving them.
Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all accounts, similar to how AWS now requires MFA for root accounts.
Be wary of web pages asking you to copy and paste commands or perform actions in Windows Run dialog (Win+R).
This matches the recently documented “ClickFix” technique where attackers trick users into running malicious commands.
For IT administrators:

Follow Microsoft’s security guidance on device authentication flows and consider disabling this feature if not required.
Enforce conditional access policies that restrict authentication based on device compliance, location, and risk factors.
Implement robust logging and monitoring for authentication events, particularly those involving new device authorizations.
Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

findcloudflare[.]com
cloudflare[.]redirectpartners[.]com
Sample JavaScript code

Decoded JavaScript code, with compromised site removed: "[removed_domain]"
Decoded JavaScript code, with compromised site removed: “[removed_domain]”

hole campaign using compromised websites to redirect visitors to malicious infrastructure designed to trick users into authorizing attacker-controlled devices […]

UK and allies expose China-based technology companies for enabling global cyber campaign against critical networks

ncsc.gov.uk The NCSC and international partners share technical details of malicious activities and urge organisations to take mitigative actions.

GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre and international partners link three China-based companies to campaign targeting foreign governments and critical networks.
Commercial cyber ecosystem with links to the Chinese intelligence services has enabled global malicious activity.
New advisory supports UK organisations in critical sectors bolster their security against China state-sponsored cyber activity
Network defenders urged to proactively hunt for activity and take steps to mitigate threat from attackers exploiting avoidable weaknesses
The UK and international allies have today (Wednesday) publicly linked three technology companies based in China with a global malicious cyber campaign targeting critical networks.

In a new advisory published today, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) – a part of GCHQ - and international partners from twelve other countries have shared technical details about how malicious cyber activities linked with these China-based commercial entities have targeted nationally significant organisations around the world.

Since at least 2021, this activity has targeted organisations in critical sectors including government, telecommunications, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure globally, with a cluster of activity observed in the UK.

The activities described in the advisory partially overlaps with campaigns previously reported by the cyber security industry most commonly under the name Salt Typhoon.

The data stolen through this activity can ultimately provide the Chinese intelligence services the capability to identify and track targets’ communications and movements worldwide.

The advisory describes how the threat actors have had considerable success taking advantage of known common vulnerabilities rather than relying on bespoke malware or zero-day vulnerabilities to carry out their activities, meaning attacks via these vectors could have been avoided with timely patching.

Organisations of national significance in the UK are encouraged to proactively hunt for malicious activity and implement mitigative actions, including ensuring that edge devices are not exposed to known vulnerabilities and implementing security updates.

NCSC Chief Executive Dr Richard Horne said:

“We are deeply concerned by the irresponsible behaviour of the named commercial entities based in China that has enabled an unrestrained campaign of malicious cyber activities on a global scale.

“It is crucial organisations in targeted critical sectors heed this international warning about the threat posed by cyber actors who have been exploiting publicly known – and so therefore fixable – vulnerabilities.

“In the face of sophisticated threats, network defenders must proactively hunt for malicious activity, as well as apply recommended mitigations based on indicators of compromise and regularly reviewing network device logs for signs of unusual activity.”

The UK has led globally in helping to improve cyber risk management with leading legislation including the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the associated Code of Practice, for which the NCSC was the technical authority.

The government's forthcoming Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will further strengthen the UK’s cyber defences, protecting the services the public rely on to go about their normal lives.

The NCSC and government partners have previously warned about the growing range of cyber threats facing critical sectors and provides a range of guidance and resources to improve resilience.

The NCSC's Early Warning service provides timely notifications about potential security issues, including known vulnerabilities, and malicious activities affecting users’ networks. All UK organisations can sign up to this free service.

The three China-based technology companies provide cyber-related services to the Chinese intelligence services and are part of a wider commercial ecosystem in China, which includes information security companies, data brokers and hackers for hire.

The named entities are: Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co Ltd, Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co, and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co Ltd.

The NCSC has co-sealed this advisory alongside agencies from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.

Targeting Iran’s Leaders, Israel Found a Weak Link: Their Bodyguards

nytimes.com By Farnaz FassihiRonen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti 2025/08/30

Israel was able to track the movements of key Iranian figures and assassinate them during the 12-day war this spring by following the cellphones carried by members of their security forces.

The meeting was so secret that only the attendees, a handful of top Iranian government officials and military commanders, knew the time and location.

It was June 16, the fourth day of Iran’s war with Israel, and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council gathered for an emergency meeting in a bunker 100 feet below a mountain slope in the western part of Tehran. For days, a relentless Israeli bombing campaign had destroyed military, government and nuclear sites around Iran, and had decimated the top echelon of Iran’s military commanders and nuclear scientists.

The officials, who included President Masoud Pezeshkian, the heads of the judiciary and the intelligence ministry and senior military commanders, arrived in separate cars. None of them carried mobile phones, knowing that Israeli intelligence could track them.

Despite all the precautions, Israeli jets dropped six bombs on top of the bunker soon after the meeting began, targeting the two entrance and exit doors. Remarkably, nobody in the bunker was killed. When the leaders later made their way out of the bunker, they found the bodies of a few guards, killed by the blasts.

The attack threw Iran’s intelligence apparatus into a tailspin, and soon enough Iranian officials discovered a devastating security lapse: The Israelis had been led to the meeting by hacking the phones of bodyguards who had accompanied the Iranian leaders to the site and waited outside.

Israel’s tracking of the guards has not been previously reported. It was one part of a larger effort to penetrate the most tightly guarded circles of Iran’s security and intelligence apparatus that has had officials in Tehran chasing shadows for two months.
According to Iranian and Israeli officials, Iranian security guards’ careless use of mobile phones over several years — including posting on social media — played a central role in allowing Israeli military intelligence to hunt Iranian nuclear scientists and military commanders and the Israeli Air Force to swoop in and kill them with missiles and bombs during the first week of the June war.

“We know senior officials and commanders did not carry phones, but their interlocutors, security guards and drivers had phones; they did not take precautions seriously, and this is how most of them were traced,” said Sasan Karimi, who previously served as the deputy vice president for strategy in Iran’s current government and is now a political analyst and lecturer at Tehran University.

The account of Israel’s strike on the meeting, and the details of how it tracked and targeted Iranian officials and commanders, is based on interviews with five senior Iranian officials, two members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and nine Israeli military and intelligence officials.

The security breakdowns with the bodyguards are just one component of what Iranian officials acknowledge has been a long-running and often successful effort by Israel to use spies and operatives placed around the country as well as technology against Iran, sometimes with devastating effect.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Iran and Israel? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

Following the most recent conflict, Iran remains focused on hunting down operatives that it fears remain present in the country and the government.

“Infiltration has reached the highest echelons of our decision making,” Mostafa Hashemi Taba, a former vice president and minister, said in an interview with Iranian media in late June.

This month Iran executed a nuclear scientist, Roozbeh Vadi, on allegations of spying for Israel and facilitating the assassination of another scientist. Three senior Iranian officials and a member of the Revolutionary Guards said Iran had quietly arrested or placed under house arrest dozens of people from the military, intelligence and government branches who were suspected of spying for Israel, some of them high-ranking. Israel has neither confirmed nor denied a connection to those so accused.

Spy games between Iran and Israel have been a constant feature of a decades-long shadow war between the two countries, and Israel’s success in June in killing so many important Iranian security figures shows just how much Israel has gained the upper hand.

President Masoud Pezeshkian of Iran attending a protest in Tehran on June 22, following the U.S. attacks on nuclear sites in Iran. Mr. Pezeshkian himself escaped an attack on a bunker on June 16.
Credit...
Arash Khamooshi for The New York Times
Israel had been tracking senior Iranian nuclear scientists since the end of 2022 and had weighed killing them as early as last October but held off to avoid a clash with the Biden administration, Israeli officials said.

From the end of last year until June, what the Israelis called a “decapitation team” reviewed the files of all the scientists in the Iranian nuclear project known to Israel, to decide which they would recommend to kill. The first list contained 400 names. That was reduced to 100, mainly based on material from an Iranian nuclear archive that the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, had stolen from Iran in 2018. In the end, Iran said the Israelis focused on and killed 13 scientists.

At the same time, Israel was building its capacity to target and kill senior Iranian military officials under a program called “Operation Red Wedding,” a play on a bloody “Game of Thrones” episode. Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ Aerospace Force, was the first target, one Israeli official said.

Ultimately, Israeli officials said, the basic idea in both operations was to locate 20 to 25 human targets in Iran and hit all of them in the opening strike of the campaign, on the assumption that they would be more careful afterward, making them much harder to hit.

In a video interview with an Iranian journalist, the newly appointed head of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, said that although Israel had human operatives and spies in the country, it had tracked senior officials and scientists and discovered the location of sensitive meetings mostly through advanced technology.

“The enemy gets the majority of its intelligence through technology, satellites and electronic data,” General Vahidi said. “They can find people, get information, their voices, images and zoom in with precise satellites and find the locations.”

From the Israeli side, Iran’s growing awareness of the threat to senior figures came to be seen as an opportunity. Fearing more assassinations on the ground of the sort that Israel had pulled off successfully in the past, the supreme Iranian leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ordered extensive security measures including large contingents of bodyguards and warned against the use of mobile phones and messaging apps like WhatsApp, which is commonly used in Iran.

Those bodyguards, Israel discovered, were not only carrying cellphones but even posting from them on social media.

“Using so many bodyguards is a weakness that we imposed on them, and we were able to take advantage of that,” one Israeli defense official said.

Iranian officials had long suspected that Israel was tracking the movements of senior military commanders and nuclear scientists through their mobile phones. Last year, after Israel detonated bombs hidden inside thousands of pagers carried by Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon, Iran banned many of its officials in particularly sensitive jobs from using smartphones, social media and messaging apps.

Smartphones are now completely off limits for senior military commanders, nuclear scientists and government officials.

The protection of senior officials, military commanders and nuclear scientists is the responsibility of an elite brigade within the Revolutionary Guards called Ansar al-Mehdi. The commander in chief of Ansar, appointed last August after the new government came into office, is Gen. Mohamad Javad Assadi, one of the youngest senior commanders in the Guards.

General Assadi had personally warned several senior commanders and a top nuclear scientist, Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, that Israel was planning to assassinate them at least a month before they were killed on the first day of the war, according to two senior Iranian officials with knowledge of the conversation. He had also called a meeting with the team leaders of security details asking them to take extra precautions, the officials said.

The cellphone ban initially did not extend to the security guards protecting the officials, scientists and commanders. That changed after Israel’s wave of assassinations on the first day of the war. Guards are now supposed to carry only walkie-talkies. Only team leaders who do not travel with the officials can carry cellphones.

But despite the new rules, according to officials who have held meetings with General Assadi about security, someone violated them and carried a phone to the National Security Council meeting, allowing the Israelis to carry out the pinpoint strike.

Hamzeh Safavi, a political and military analyst whose father is the top military adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, said that Israel’s technological superiority over Iran was an existential threat. He said Iran had no choice but to conduct a security shakedown, overhaul its protocols and make difficult decisions — including arrests and prosecution of high-level spies.

“We must do whatever it takes to identify and address this threat; we have a major security and intelligence bug and nothing is more urgent than repairing this hole,” Mr. Safavi said in a telephone interview.

Iran’s minister of intelligence said in a statement this month that it had foiled an Israeli assassination attempt on 23 senior officials but did not provide their names or details of their positions and ranks. It said in the months leading up to the war, Iran had discovered and foiled 13 plots by Israel that aimed to kill 35 senior military and government officials. (An Israeli intelligence official disputed the Iranian account, saying that Israel had not been carrying out operations ahead of the surprise attack in June that could have led to heightened alertness on the part of Iran.)

The statement also said that security forces had identified and arrested 21 people on charges of spying for the Mossad and working as field and support operators in at least 11 provinces around Iran.

Iran has also accelerated efforts to recruit its own spies in Israel since the attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, which ignited the war in the Gaza Strip and triggered aggressive Israeli military operations in Iran and Lebanon.

Over the past year, Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic intelligence service, has arrested dozens of Israelis and charged them with being paid agents of Iran, accused of helping collect intelligence about potential targets for Iranian strikes on Israel.

Israel has made killing Iran’s top nuclear scientists an urgent priority as a way to set back the nation’s nuclear program, even poisoning two young upcoming scientists.

As Iran made steady progress over the years toward enriching its uranium stockpile into near-weapons grade material, Israeli military and intelligence officials concluded that the campaign of sabotage and explosions in the enrichment apparatus, which the Mossad had been engaged in for many years, had only a marginal impact.

In 2021, according to three Israeli security officials, the focus turned to what Israeli officials called “the weapon group” — a cadre of Iranian scientists who the Israelis believed met regularly to work on building a device to trigger the enriched uranium and cause a nuclear explosion. This is one of the most technologically difficult parts of a nuclear project. (Iran has said its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, and the U.N.’s atomic watchdog and American intelligence agencies have long assessed that Iran has not weaponized its nuclear project.)

It was this group of scientists that became the focus of what Israel called Operation Narnia, the military plan to kill off scientists during the war’s early days this spring.

By the time of the June 16 national security meeting of top Iranian officials, Israel had already killed a number of high-profile figures associated with the nuclear program, including Mr. Tehranchi and Fereydoun Abbasi, another nuclear scientist, both killed just days earlier. The cellphones of their bodyguards helped Israel target all of them.

But Israel was also targeting a wide variety of Iranian leaders, including the heads of government branches at the national security meeting, and killed at least 30 senior military commanders through strikes during the war.

General Hajizadeh, the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ air force, assembled his leadership team, accompanied by their security units, at the very start of the war to monitor intelligence about possible Israeli strikes. Israeli warplanes swooped in and carried out a pinpoint strike on the bunker where General Hajizadeh had taken refuge, killing him and other top commanders.

Mr. Hajizadeh’s son Alireza has said that his father took extra caution with phones. On a video published on Iranian media, he said that “when my father wanted to discuss something important he would tell us to take the phones and smart devices out of the room and place it far away.”

The ability to track the bodyguards also helped lead the Israelis to the June 16 meeting. The attendees, in addition to Mr. Pezeshkian, the Iranian president, included the speaker of Parliament, Gen. Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, and the head of the judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei. Also on hand were the ministers of the interior, defense and intelligence and military commanders, some brand-new to their jobs after their bosses had been killed in previous strikes.

The attack destroyed the room, which soon filled with debris, smoke and dust, and the power was cut, according to accounts that emerged afterward. Mr. Pezeshkian found a narrow opening through the debris, where a sliver of light and oxygen was coming through, he has said publicly.

Three senior officials said the president dug through the debris with his bare hands, eventually making enough of a space for everyone to crawl out one by one. Mr. Pezeshkian had a minor leg injury from a shrapnel wound and the minister of interior was taken to the hospital for respiratory distress, officials said.

“There was only one hole, and we saw there was air coming and we said, we won’t suffocate. Life hinges on one second,” Mr. Pezeshkian said recently, recounting the attack in a meeting with senior clerics, according to a video published in Iranian media. He said if Israel had succeeded in killing the country’s top officials it would have created chaos in the country.

“People,” he said, “would have lost hope.”

State-Sponsored Hackers Behind Majority of Vulnerability Exploits - Infosecurity Magazine

infosecurity-magazine James Coker
Deputy Editor, Infosecurity Magazine 29 Aug 2025

Recorded Future highlighted the vast capabilities of state actors to rapidly weaponize newly disclosed vulnerabilities for geopolitical purposes

The majority (53%) of attributed vulnerability exploits in the first half 2025 were conducted by state-sponsored actors for strategic, geopolitical purposes, according to a new report by Recorded Future’s Insikt Group.

The researchers said the findings demonstrate the growing ability of well-resourced state-sponsored groups to weaponize flaws rapidly following disclosure. Geopolitical purposes, such as espionage and surveillance, are the key motives for these threat actors.

“The significant state-sponsored involvement also implies that these threats are not just random or opportunistic but often targeted and persistent campaigns aiming at specific sectors or high-value systems,” they noted.

The majority of state-sponsored campaigns were conducted by Chinese state-sponsored actors. These groups primarily targeted edge infrastructure and enterprise solutions, a tactic that has continued since 2024.

Read now: Chinese Tech Firms Linked to Salt Typhoon Espionage Campaigns

The suspected China-linked group UNC5221 exploited the highest number of vulnerabilities in H1 2025. It demonstrated a preference for Ivanti products, including Endpoint Manager Mobile, Connect Secure and Policy Secure.

Financially motivated groups accounted for the remaining 47% of vulnerability exploits – 27% were made up of those actors involved in theft and fraud but not linked to ransomware and 20% attributed to ransomware and extortion groups.

The researchers predicted that the exploitation of edge security appliances, remote access tools and other gateway-layer software will remain a top priority for both state-sponsored and financially-motivated groups.

“The strategic value of these systems – acting as intermediaries for encrypted traffic and privileged access – makes them high-reward targets,” they noted.

Microsoft was the most targeted vendor, with the tech giant’s products accounting for 17% of exploitations.

Most Vulnerability Exploits Required No Authentication
Insikt Group’s H1 2025 Malware and Vulnerability Trends report, published on August 28, found that the total number of disclosed common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) grew 16% year-over-year.

Attackers exploited 161 distinct vulnerabilities in the six-month period, up from 136 in H1 2024.

Of the 161 flaws, 69% required no authentication to exploit, while 48% could be exploited remotely over a network.

“This heavy tilt toward unauthenticated, remote exploits means that attacks can be launched directly from the internet against vulnerable hosts, with no credentials or insider access needed,” the researchers commented.

Additionally, 30% of the exploited CVEs enabled remote code execution (RCE), which often grants an attacker full control over the target system.

ClickFix Becomes a Favored Initial Access Technique
The report observed that ransomware actors adopted new initial access techniques in H1 2025.

This included a significant increase in ClickFix social engineering attacks. ClickFix involves the use of a fake error or verification message to manipulate victims into copying and pasting a malicious script and then running it.

The tactic preys on users’ desire to fix problems themselves rather than alerting their IT team or anyone else. Therefore, it is effective at bypassing security protections as the victim infects themselves.

The Interlock gang was observed using ClickFix in campaigns in January and February 2025.

The group has also leveraged FileFix in later attacks. This tactic is an evolution on ClickFix, where users are tricked into pasting a malicious file path into a Windows File Explorer’s address bar rather than using a dialog box.

Inskit group assess that the success of ClickFix means this method will remain a favored initial access technique through the rest of 2025 unless widespread mitigations reduce its effectiveness.

Post-compromise, ransomware groups have increased their use of endpoint detection and response (EDR) evasion via bring-your-own-installer (BYOI) techniques, and custom payloads using just-in-time (JIT) hooking and memory injection to bypass detection.

Chinese hack group targets Dutch internet providers, intelligence agencies confirm | NL Times

nltimes.nl/ Thursday, 28 August 2025 - 12:50 -
Dutch intelligence agencies confirmed on Thursday that the country was targeted in the global cyberespionage campaign carried out by the Chinese state-linked hacker group Salt Typhoon. The campaign, which came to light in late 2024, focused on the international telecommunications sector.

The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) said they independently verified portions of a U.S. investigation attributing the campaign to Salt Typhoon. “We can confirm parts of the U.S. findings through our own intelligence,” the agencies stated.

The warning aligns with alerts issued by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as European intelligence services including Germany’s BND, Finland’s SUPO, the U.K.’s NCSC, and Italy’s AISE.

In the Netherlands, the targets were smaller Internet service and hosting providers rather than the major telecom operators. Investigations by the MIVD and AIVD indicate that the hackers gained access to routers of Dutch targets but, as far as is known, did not penetrate internal networks further. Where possible, the agencies and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) shared threat information with affected organizations.

The agencies emphasized that China’s cyber activities have become increasingly sophisticated. “These activities are now so advanced that continuous effort and attention are needed to detect and counter cyber operations against Dutch interests,” the MIVD and AIVD said. They added that while proactive measures can reduce risk, complete prevention is not possible, posing a significant challenge to national cyber resilience