he maintainers of the FreeBSD operating system have released updates to remediate a security vulnerability impacting the ping module that could be potentially exploited to crash the program or trigger remote code execution.
The issue, assigned the identifier CVE-2022-23093, impacts all supported versions of FreeBSD and concerns a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the ping service.
Unit 42 researchers examine several malware samples that incorporate Cobalt Strike components, and discuss some of the ways that we catch these samples by analyzing artifacts from the deltas in process memory at key points of execution. We will also discuss the evasion tactics used by these threats, and other issues that make their analysis problematic.
In October of this year, we received a report from ngocnb and khuyenn from GiaoHangTietKiem JSC covering a SQL injection vulnerability in WordPress. The bug could allow an attacker to expose data stored in a connected database. This vulnerability was recently addressed as CVE-2022-21661 ( ZDI-22-020
Thousands of small to medium size businesses are suffering as Rackspace have suffered a security incident on their Hosted Exchange service.
Yesterday, 2nd December 2022, Rackspace announced an outage to their Hosted Exchange Server:
The goal of this blog post is to present a privilege escalation I found while working on ADCS. We will see how it is possible to elevate our privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM from virtual and network service accounts of a domain-joined machine (for example from a webshell on a Windows server) using ADCS. I want to call this attack chain “CertPotato” as homage to other *Potato tools and as a way to better remember it.
A popular technique for getting SYSTEM from a virtual or network service account is Delegate 2 Thyself by Charlie Clark. This technique involves using RBCD to elevate your privileges. In this article, I propose an alternative approach to become local SYSTEM using ADCS.
As we report more fully below, in the wake of Russian battlefield losses to Ukraine this fall, Moscow has intensified its multi-pronged hybrid technology approach to pressure the sources of Kyiv’s military and political support, domestic and foreign. This approach has included destructive missile and cyber strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, cyberattacks on Ukrainian and now foreign-based supply chains, and cyber-enabled influence operations[1]—intended to undermine US, EU, and NATO political support for Ukraine, and to shake the confidence and determination of Ukrainian citizens.