The Lumma Stealer malware campaign is exploiting compromised educational institutions to distribute malicious LNK files disguised as PDFs, targeting industries like finance, healthcare, technology, and media. Once executed, these files initiate a stealthy multi-stage infection process, allowing cybercriminals to steal passwords, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallets. With sophisticated evasion techniques, including using Steam profiles for command-and-control operations, this malware-as-a-service (MaaS) threat highlights the urgent need for robust cybersecurity defenses. Stay vigilant against deceptive phishing tactics to protect sensitive information from cyber exploitation.

Cisco Talos has been closely monitoring reports of widespread intrusion activity against several major U.S. telecommunications companies, by a threat actor dubbed Salt Typhoon. This blog highlights our observations on this campaign and identifies recommendations for detection and prevention.

First observed in March 2024, “BlackLock” (aka El Dorado or Eldorado) has rapidly emerged as a major player in the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem. By Q4 2024, it ranked as the 7th most prolific ransomware group on data-leak sites, fueled by a staggering 1,425% increase in activity from Q3. BlackLock uses a double extortion tactic—encrypting data while stealing sensitive information—to pressure victims with the threat of public exposure. Its ransomware is built to target Windows, VMWare ESXi, and Linux environments, though the Linux variant offers fewer features than its Windows counterpart.

Our first network security analysis of the popular Chinese social media platform, RedNote, revealed numerous issues with the Android and iOS versions of the app. Most notably, we found that both the Android and iOS versions of RedNote fetch viewed images and videos without any encryption, which enables network eavesdroppers to learn exactly what content users are browsing. We also found a vulnerability in the Android version that enables network attackers to learn the contents of files on users’ devices. We disclosed the vulnerability issues to RedNote, and its vendors NEXTDATA, and MobTech, but did not receive a response from any party. This report underscores the importance of using well-supported encryption implementations, such as transport layer security (TLS). We recommend that users who are highly concerned about network surveillance from any party refrain from using RedNote until these security issues are resolved.

Google Threat Intelligence Group discusses the current state of cybercrime, and why it must be considered a national security threat.

Discover BADBOX, a new botnet pre-infecting Android devices—including TVs—via factory malware. Explore supply chain threats from one SSL certificate.

Learn how the WantToCry ransomware group is exploiting vulnerable SMB (Server Message Block) services to launch devastating attacks. Understand the risks of misconfigured SMB and discover best practices to protect your organization from ransomware.

Cisco Talos discovered an ongoing malicious campaign operated by a financially motivated threat actor targeting users, predominantly in Poland and Germany.

• The actor has delivered different payloads, including Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger, and a new undocumented backdoor we are calling TorNet, dropped by PureCrypter malware.
• The actor is running a Windows scheduled task on victim machines—including on endpoints with a low battery—to achieve persistence.
• The actor also disconnects the victim machine from the network before dropping the payload and then connects it back to the network, allowing them to evade detection by cloud antimalware solutions.
• We also found that the actor connects the victim’s machine to the TOR network using the TorNet backdoor for stealthy command and control (C2) communications and detection evasion.

Salt Typhoon, a state-sponsored actor linked to the People’s Republic of China, has breached at least nine U.S.-based telecommunications companies with the intent to target high profile government and political figures. Tenable Research examines the tactics, techniques and procedures of this threat actor.

We dive into FleshStealer, a new strain of information-stealing malware—explaining what it is and its potential impact on organizations.

Analysis of payloads suggest affiliates may be using a shared codebase or common builder to deploy attacks under different RaaS brand names.

The Qualys Threat Research Unit has uncovered a large-scale, ongoing operation within the Mirai campaign, dubbed Murdoc Botnet.

The Gootloader malware family uses a distinctive form of social engineering to infect computers: Its creators lure people to visit compromised, legitimate WordPress websites using hijacked Google search results, present the visitors to these sites with a simulated online message board, and link to the malware from a simulated “conversation” where a fake visitor asks a fake site admin the exact question that the victim was searching for an answer to.

This blog analysis regarding a recent threat actor posting, which claims to offer compromised configuration and VPN credentials from FortiGate devices, provides factual information to help our customers better understand the situation and make informed decisions.

Open-source intelligence reveals the server-side code of this pernicious SEO-driven malware – without needing a lawyer afterward

Introduction In the ever-evolving world of cybercrime, IntelBroker has emerged as one of its most prominent figures. Known for his high-profile breaches, IntelBroker’s actions have shaken both corporations and government entities alike. At KELA, our deep dive into his online presence has revealed valuable insights, with OSINT traces playing a pivotal role in uncovering his […]

Executive Summary: Since September, Check Point Research (CPR) has been monitoring a new version of the Banshee macOS Stealer, a malware that steals

After the excitement of our .MOBI research, we were left twiddling our thumbs. As you may recall, in 2024, we demonstrated the impact of an unregistered domain when we subverted the TLS/SSL CA process for verifying domain ownership to give ourselves the ability to issue valid and trusted TLS/

• FireScam is an information stealing malware with spyware capabilities.
  It is distributed as a fake ‘Telegram Premium’ APK via a phishing website hosted on the GitHub.io domain, mimicking the RuStore app store.
• The phishing website delivers a dropper that installs the FireScam malware disguised as the Telegram Premium application.
• The malware exfiltrates sensitive data, including notifications, messages, and other app data, to a Firebase Realtime Database endpoint.
• FireScam monitors device activities such as screen state changes, e-commerce transactions, clipboard activity, and user engagement to gather valuable information covertly.
• Captures notifications across various apps, including system apps, to potentially steal sensitive information and track user activities.
• It employs obfuscation techniques to hide its intent and evade detection by security tools and researchers.
• FireScam performs checks to identify if it is running in an analysis or virtualized environment.
• The malware leverages Firebase for command-and-control communication, data storage, and to deliver additional malicious payloads.
• Exfiltrated data is temporarily stored in the Firebase Realtime Database, filtered for valuable content, and later removed.
• The Firebase database reveals potential Telegram IDs linked to the threat actors and contains URLs to other malware specimens hosted on the phishing site.
• By exploiting the popularity of messaging apps and other widely used applications, FireScam poses a significant threat to individuals and organizations worldwide.

We agree - modern security engineering is hard - but none of this is modern. We are discussing vulnerability classes - with no sophisticated trigger mechanisms that fuzzing couldnt find - discovered in the 1990s, that can be trivially discovered via basic fuzzing, SAST (the things product security teams do with real code access).

As an industry, should we really be communicating that these vulnerability classes are simply too complex for a multi-billion dollar technology company that builds enterprise-grade, enterprise-priced network security solutions to proactively resolve?