To attract users across the Global Majority, many technology companies have introduced “lite” versions of their products: Applications that are designed for lower-bandwidth contexts. TikTok is no exception, with TikTok Lite estimated to have more than 1 billion users.
Mozilla and AI Forensics research reveals that TikTok Lite doesn’t just reduce required bandwidth, however. In our opinion, it also reduces trust and safety. In comparing TikTok Lite with the classic TikTok app, we found several discrepancies between trust and safety features that could have potentially dangerous consequences in the context of elections and public health.
Our research revealed TikTok Lite lacks basic protections that are afforded to other TikTok users, including content labels for graphic, AI-generated, misinformation, and dangerous acts videos. TikTok Lite users also encounter arbitrarily shortened video descriptions that can easily eliminate crucial context.
Further, TikTok Lite users have fewer proactive controls at their disposal. Unlike traditional TikTok users, they cannot filter offensive keywords or implement screen management practices.
Our findings are concerning, and reinforce patterns of double-standard. Technology platforms have a history of neglecting users outside of the US and EU, where there is markedly less potential for constraining regulation and enforcement. As part of our research, we discuss the implications of this pattern and also offer concrete recommendations for TikTok Lite to improve.
Sekoia.io investigated the mysterious 7777 botnet (aka. Quad7 botnet), published by the independent researcher Gi7w0rm inside the “The curious case of the 7777 botnet” blogpost.
This investigation allowed us to intercept network communications and malware deployed on a TP-Link router compromised by the Quad7 botnet in France.
To our understanding, the Quad7 botnet operators leverage compromised TP-Link routers to relay password spraying attacks against Microsoft 365 accounts without any specific targeting.
Therefore, we link the Quad7 botnet activity to possible long term business email compromise (BEC) cybercriminal activity rather than an APT threat actor.
However, certain mysteries remain regarding the exploits used to compromise the routers, the geographical distribution of the botnet and the attribution of this activity cluster to a specific threat actor.
The insecure architecture of this botnet led us to think that it can be hijacked by other threat actors to install their own implants on the compromised TP-Link routers by using the Quad7 botnet accesses.
Secure and private AI processing in the cloud poses a formidable new challenge. To support advanced features of Apple Intelligence with larger foundation models, we created Private Cloud Compute (PCC), a groundbreaking cloud intelligence system designed specifically for private AI processing. Built with custom Apple silicon and a hardened operating system, Private Cloud Compute extends the industry-leading security and privacy of Apple devices into the cloud, making sure that personal user data sent to PCC isn’t accessible to anyone other than the user — not even to Apple. We believe Private Cloud Compute is the most advanced security architecture ever deployed for cloud AI compute at scale.
In mid-April 2024, Trellix Advanced Research Center team members observed multiple fake AV sites hosting highly sophisticated malicious files such as APK, EXE and Inno setup installer that includes Spy and Stealer capabilities. Hosting malicious software through sites which look legitimate is predatory to general consumers, especially those who look to protect their devices from cyber-attacks. The hosted websites made to look legitimate are listed below.
Cybersecurity has always been transient: what is deemed to be secure today, may be considered easily hackable tomorrow. Domain names in web and e-mail addresses, such as info@inti.io, are leased in time. This means that if nobody thinks of renewing them after they expire, they will be put up for sale. It made me wonder what would happen to the graveyard of cloud accounts attached to the e-mail addresses that once belonged to these expired domains.
This article presents a case study on new applications of domain name system (DNS) tunneling we have found in the wild. These techniques expand beyond DNS tunneling only for command and control (C2) and virtual private network (VPN) purposes.
Malicious actors occasionally employ DNS tunneling as a covert communications channel, because it can bypass conventional network firewalls. This allows C2 traffic and data exfiltration that can remain hidden from some traditional detection methods.
Unit 42 researchers have discovered that the Muddled Libra group now actively targets software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications and cloud service provider (CSP) environments. Organizations often store a variety of data in SaaS applications and use services from CSPs. The threat actors have begun attempting to leverage some of this data to assist with their attack progression, and to use for extortion when trying to monetize their work.
In a previous blog post we described a process injection vulnerability affecting all AppKit-based macOS applications. This research was presented at Black Hat USA 2022, DEF CON 30 and Objective by the Sea v5. This vulnerability was actually the second universal process injection vulnerability we reported to Apple, but it was fixed earlier than the first. Because it shared some parts of the exploit chain with the first one, there were a few steps we had to skip in the earlier post and the presentations. Now that the first vulnerability has been fixed in macOS 13.0 (Ventura) and improved in macOS 14.0 (Sonoma), we can detail the first one and thereby fill in the blanks of the previous post.
This vulnerability was independently found by Adam Chester and written up here under the name “DirtyNIB”. While the exploit chain demonstrated by Adam shares a lot of similarity to ours, our attacks trigger automatically and do not require a user to click a button, making them a lot more stealthy. Therefore we decided to publish our own version of this write-up as well.