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2 résultats taggé AyySSHush  ✕
Tracking AyySSHush: a Newly Discovered ASUS Router Botnet Campaign https://censys.com/blog/tracking-ayysshush-a-newly-discovered-asus-router-botnet-campaign
30/05/2025 18:45:04
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Executive Summary:

  • A new, stealthy ASUS router botnet, dubbed AyySSHush, abuses trusted firmware features through a multi-stage attack sequence to backdoor routers and persist across firmware updates, evading traditional detection methods.
  • GreyNoise observed the campaign in March 2025; Censys scan data reveals its global footprint and how it's evolved over the past five months
    4,504 ASUS devices show indicators of compromise as of May 28, 2025, identified by having SSH running on port TCP/53282 — a relatively strong indicator of AyySSHush compromise since this high, nonstandard port is specifically used by the botnet
  • The compromises are globally spread with an APAC concentration: the top affected countries include the U.S., Sweden, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
  • Residential ISPs across Asia, Europe, and the U.S. appear to be the main targeted networks, aligning with the typically observed residential proxy botnet strategy that mimics legitimate users to evade detection.
    Historical trends in compromises observed online reveal a highly dynamic scale of botnet operations that rapidly scaled up and down by 50% in a matter of weeks
  • Attackers leverage ASUS's own built-in configuration tools to inject SSH keys that survive firmware resets -- patching alone isn't enough.
  • Check out our live dashboard tracking exposed ASUS devices with indicators of compromise
    Introduction
    On March 18 2025, researchers at GreyNoise uncovered a sophisticated botnet campaign targeting ASUS routers. Dubbed AyySSHush, the operation exploits legitimate features of ASUS’s AiProtection system to implant persistent SSH backdoors that survive firmware resets. This is an alarming example of threat actors exploiting vendor-sanctioned capabilities to establish a persistent, hard-to-detect presence in consumer-grade hardware.

Censys has been tracking this botnet’s global footprint in partnership with findings from both GreyNoise and Sekoia researchers.

To aid in ongoing tracking and research, we’ve launched a live dashboard that tracks exposed ASUS routers showing indicators of AyySSHush compromise. The data updates daily and provides real-time insight into global trends.

censys EN 2025 ASUS router botnet AyySSHush
AyySSHush: Tradecraft of an emergent ASUS botnet https://www.labs.greynoise.io//grimoire/2025-03-28-ayysshush/
28/05/2025 15:57:58
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Using an AI powered network traffic analysis tool we built called SIFT, GreyNoise has caught multiple anomalous network payloads with zero-effort that are attempting to disable TrendMicro security features in ASUS routers, then exploit vulnerabilities and novel tradecraft in ASUS AiProtection features on those routers.

Irony? Top Score. You love to see it.

Note: This activity was first discovered by GreyNoise on March 18, 2025. Public disclosure was deferred as we coordinated the findings with government and industry partners.

In summary, we are observing an ongoing wave of exploitation targeting ASUS routers, combining both old and new attack methods. After an initial wave of generic brute-force attacks targeting login.cgi, we observe subsequent attempts exploiting older authentication bypass vulnerabilities. Using either of the above methods to gain privileged access to ASUS hardware, we observe payloads exploiting a command injection vulnerability to create an empty file at /tmp/BWSQL_LOG. This existence of a file at this path enables BWDPI logging, a TrendMicro feature embedded in ASUS routers.

Finally, we see remote SSH enabled on a high port TCP/53282 through the official ASUS settings with an attacker controlled public key added to the router’s keyring. This grants the attacker exclusive SSH access. Additionally, because the backdoor is part of the official ASUS settings, it will persist across firmware upgrades, even after the original vulnerability used to gain access has been patched.

The attacker controlled pubkey that is added is:

ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAo41nBoVFfj4HlVMGV+YPsxMDrMlbdDZJ8L5mzhhaxfGzpHR8Geay/xDlVDSJ8MJwA4RJ7o21KVfRXqFblQH4L6fWIYd1ClQbZ6Kk1uA1r7qx1qEQ2PqdVMhnNdHACvCVz/MPHTVebtkKhEl98MZiMOvUNPtAC9ppzOSi7xz3cSV0n1pG/dj+37pzuZUpm4oGJ3XQR2tUPz5MddupjJq9/gmKH6SJjTrHKSECe5yEDs6c3v6uN4dnFNYA5MPZ52FGbkhzQ5fy4dPNf0peszR28XGkZk9ctORNCGXZZ4bEkGHYut5uvwVK1KZOYJRmmj63drEgdIioFv/x6IcCcKgi2w== rsa 2048
You can find an actively growing list of backdoored hosts here: Censys Search. This list provides detailed information on hosts with the backdoor in question.

Now let’s go threat hunting!

👋 botnet operator, we were watching.

labs.greynoise.io EN 2025 AyySSHush ASUS botnet routers CVE-2023-39780
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