In December 2023, the Molfar website experienced a DDoS attack. This occurred immediately after the publication of our extensive investigation into the production of Shaheds and Lancets, which included the deanon of the family of chief designer Zakharov. Recently, Molfar discovered who was behind that DDos attack.
Molfar's OSINT analysts, in collaboration with the DC8044 F33d community team, identified several Russian hackers allegedly connected to Russian state structures and received funding from them. Some of these individuals are Ukrainian.
This post is part of an analysis that I have carried out during my spare time, motivated by a friend that asked me to have a look at the DDosia project related to the NoName057(16) group. The reason behind this request was caused by DDosia client changes for performing the DDos attacks. Because of that, all procedures used so far for monitoring NoName057(16) activities did not work anymore.
In the dynamic and rapidly shifting landscape of hacktivism, few entities have managed to capture as much attention as NoName057(16). Once branded as the
NoName057(16) relies heavily on HTTPS application-layer DDoS attacks, with many attacks repeatedly sourced from the same attack harness, networks, and targeting similar countries and industries.
