interestingengineering.com
By Bojan Stojkovski
Nov 23, 2025 02:26 PM EST

A new simulation by Chinese defense researchers suggests that jamming Starlink coverage over an area the size of Taiwan is technically possible.

Instead of focusing on whether Starlink can be jammed in theory, Chinese military planners are increasingly concerned with how such a feat could be attempted in a real conflict over Taiwan. The challenge is staggering: Taiwan and its allies could rely on a constellation of more than 10,000 satellites that hop frequencies, reroute traffic and resist interference in real time.

However, a recent simulation study by Chinese researchers delivers the most detailed public attempt yet to model a potential countermeasure.

Published on November 5 in the peer-reviewed journal Systems Engineering and Electronics, the paper concludes that disrupting Starlink across an area comparable to Taiwan is technically achievable – but only with a massive electronic warfare (EW) force.

Dynamic Starlink network poses major hurdle for EW
Rather than treating Starlink as a static system, Chinese researchers emphasize that its constantly shifting geometry is the real obstacle. In their peer-reviewed study, the team from Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology notes that the constellation’s orbital planes are continuously changing, with satellites moving in and out of view at all times.

This dynamic behavior creates extreme uncertainty for any military attempting to monitor, track or interfere with Starlink’s downlink signals, the South China Morning Post reports. Unlike older satellite networks that depend on a few big geostationary satellites parked over the equator, Starlink behaves nothing like a fixed target.

Traditional systems can be jammed by simply overpowering the signal from the ground, but Starlink changes the equation. Its satellites are low-orbit, fast-moving and deployed by the thousands. A single user terminal never stays linked to just one satellite – it rapidly switches between several, forming a constantly shifting mesh in the sky. As the researchers explain, even if one link is successfully jammed, the connection simply jumps to another within seconds, making interference far harder to sustain.

Distributed jamming swarms seen as the sole viable method
Yang’s research team explains that the only realistic countermeasure would be a fully distributed jamming strategy. Instead of using a few powerful ground stations, an attacker would need hundreds – or even thousands – of small, synchronized jammers deployed in the air on drones, balloons or aircraft. Together, these platforms would form a wide electromagnetic barrier over the combat zone.

The simulation tested realistic jamming by having each airborne jammer broadcast noise at different power levels. Researchers compared wide‑beam antennas that cover more area with less energy to narrow‑beam antennas that are stronger but require precise aiming. For every point on the ground, the model calculated whether a Starlink terminal could still maintain a usable signal.

The Chinese researchers calculated that fully suppressing Starlink over Taiwan, roughly 13,900 square miles, would require at least 935 synchronized jamming platforms, not including backups for failures, terrain interference, or future Starlink upgrades. Using cheaper 23 dBW power sources with spacing of about 3 miles would push the requirement to around 2,000 airborne units, though the team stressed the results remain preliminary since key Starlink anti‑jamming details are still confidential.

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