ctrlaltnod.com
Emanuel DE ALMEIDA
January 29, 2026
SonicWall cloud breach led to ransomware attack affecting 74+ US banks and 400,000+ individuals via Marquis Software Solutions compromise.
TL;DR
Marquis Software Solutions suffered a ransomware attack on August 14, 2025, affecting over 74 U.S. banks and credit unions and compromising data of 400,000+ individuals
Investigation revealed attackers exploited configuration data stolen from SonicWall's cloud backup service breach in September 2025
State-sponsored hackers accessed SonicWall's MySonicWall cloud service via API calls, initially affecting "less than 5%" but later confirmed to impact all cloud backup customers
The attack bypassed Marquis's firewall defenses using stolen configuration files rather than exploiting CVE-2024-40766 as initially suspected
Marquis is pursuing legal recourse against SonicWall and evaluating options to recover expenses from the incident
Verified Timeline
August 14, 2025 — Marquis Software Solutions detected suspicious network activity and confirmed ransomware attack, initiated investigation with cybersecurity experts
September 17, 2025 — SonicWall disclosed security incident involving unauthorized access to MySonicWall cloud backup files, initially reporting less than 5% of firewall customers affected
October 9, 2025 — SonicWall updated disclosure, confirming all customers using cloud backup service were impacted
November 5, 2025 — SonicWall attributed breach to state-sponsored hackers who accessed cloud backup files via API call
December 3, 2025 — Marquis began notifying affected banks and credit unions about data breach from August ransomware attack
January 29, 2026 — Marquis publicly attributed ransomware attack to exploitation of configuration data from SonicWall's cloud backup breach
What We Know vs. What's Unclear
Confirmed
State-sponsored hackers breached SonicWall's MySonicWall cloud service in September 2025
All SonicWall customers using cloud backup service were affected, not just 5% as initially reported
Attackers accessed firewall configuration backup files via API calls
Marquis ransomware attack on August 14, 2025 affected 74+ U.S. financial institutions
Over 400,000 individuals had personal information compromised
Attackers used stolen SonicWall configuration data to circumvent Marquis firewall defenses
CVE-2024-40766 was not the primary attack vector as initially suspected
Unclear or Unconfirmed
Identity of the state-sponsored threat group behind SonicWall breach
Specific ransomware family used in Marquis attack
Exact method attackers used configuration data to bypass security controls
Whether the same threat actors were responsible for both SonicWall breach and Marquis attack
Full scope of additional organizations potentially compromised using stolen SonicWall data
Timeline between SonicWall data theft and Marquis attack initiation
Who Is Affected
This interconnected breach affected multiple stakeholder groups across the financial services sector:
Primary Victims: Marquis Software Solutions, a Texas-based financial services provider, serves as the central victim of the ransomware attack that leveraged stolen SonicWall configuration data.
Financial Institutions: Over 74 U.S. banks and credit unions that utilize Marquis services experienced data exposure. These institutions face potential regulatory scrutiny, customer trust erosion, and compliance obligations under financial data protection regulations.
Individual Consumers: More than 400,000 individuals associated with affected financial institutions had sensitive personal information compromised, including Social Security numbers, Taxpayer Identification Numbers, financial account details, and personal identifiers.
SonicWall Customers: All customers using SonicWall's MySonicWall cloud backup service experienced configuration file exposure, potentially enabling similar attacks against other organizations using compromised firewall settings.
Broader Impact: The incident demonstrates supply chain vulnerability risks, where third-party service breaches can enable downstream attacks against customers who may have maintained otherwise secure configurations.
Technical Details
SonicWall Breach Vector: State-sponsored hackers accessed SonicWall's MySonicWall cloud service through API calls, successfully extracting firewall configuration backup files stored in the cloud environment. The breach occurred in September 2025, with SonicWall initially underestimating the scope before confirming all cloud backup customers were affected.
CVE-2024-40766 Context: Initially suspected as the attack vector, CVE-2024-40766 represents an improper access control vulnerability in SonicWall's SSLVPN feature that allows authentication bypass. This critical vulnerability was patched by SonicWall in August 2024, but investigators determined it was not the primary attack method used against Marquis.
Attack Methodology: Rather than exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities, attackers leveraged configuration data stolen from SonicWall's cloud service to understand and circumvent Marquis's firewall defenses. The specific technical methods used to weaponize configuration files have not been disclosed.
Ransomware Details: The specific ransomware family deployed against Marquis has not been publicly disclosed. The incident reflects broader trends where ransomware groups adopt new tactics to maximize impact and evade traditional security measures. Technical indicators of compromise and malware signatures remain unavailable in public reporting.
CVSS Scoring: CVE-2024-40766 maintains critical severity ratings, though specific CVSS scores were not confirmed in available sources. The vulnerability's critical classification reflects its potential for authentication bypass in SSLVPN implementations.
Detection & Validation
Organizations can implement several detection strategies to identify potential exploitation of stolen configuration data:
Firewall Configuration Monitoring: Implement continuous monitoring of firewall rule changes, VPN configuration modifications, and access control list updates. Establish alerts for unauthorized configuration changes or suspicious administrative access patterns.
Network Traffic Analysis: Monitor for unusual network traffic patterns that might indicate attackers leveraging knowledge of internal network configurations. Focus on connections to previously unknown external IP addresses or unexpected internal network traversal.
Authentication Log Review: Examine VPN and administrative access logs for successful authentication attempts using compromised credentials or from unexpected geographic locations. Look for authentication events occurring outside normal business hours.
API Activity Monitoring: For organizations using cloud-based firewall management services, monitor API call patterns and authenticate all management interface access. Implement alerting for bulk configuration downloads or unusual API usage patterns.
Endpoint Detection: Deploy endpoint detection and response tools to identify lateral movement techniques that attackers might employ after gaining initial access through compromised firewall configurations.
Specific IOCs: Specific indicators of compromise related to this incident have not been publicly disclosed by affected organizations or security vendors.
Mitigation & Hardening
Immediate Credential Reset: Reset all credentials, API keys, and authentication tokens used by users, VPN accounts, and administrative services. This includes service accounts and automated system credentials that may have been exposed in configuration files.
Firewall Configuration Audit: Conduct comprehensive review of current firewall rules, VPN configurations, and access control policies. Compare current settings against known-good baselines to identify unauthorized modifications.
Multi-Factor Authentication Implementation: Deploy MFA across all administrative interfaces, VPN connections, and cloud management portals. Prioritize hardware-based tokens or certificate-based authentication for high-privilege accounts.
Network Segmentation Review: Reassess network segmentation strategies to limit potential lateral movement if perimeter defenses are compromised. Implement zero-trust principles for internal network communications.
Cloud Service Security Assessment: Evaluate security posture of all third-party cloud services, particularly those handling configuration data or backup files. Implement additional encryption and access controls where possible.
Patch Management Acceleration: Ensure all network security devices receive priority patching, particularly SonicWall devices that should be updated to address CVE-2024-40766 and other known vulnerabilities.
Monitoring Enhancement: Deploy enhanced network monitoring tools to detect configuration-based attacks and unusual administrative activity. Establish baselines for normal network behavior patterns.
Incident Response Planning: Update incident response procedures to address supply chain compromise scenarios where third-party service breaches enable downstream attacks.
FAQ
How did attackers use SonicWall configuration data to compromise Marquis?
According to Marquis's statement, attackers leveraged configuration data extracted from SonicWall's cloud backup breach to circumvent their firewall defenses. The stolen configuration files likely contained network topology information, firewall rules, and security policies that attackers used to identify weaknesses and craft targeted bypass techniques. Specific technical details of how configuration data was weaponized have not been publicly disclosed.
Were SonicWall customers who don't use cloud backup affected?
No, the SonicWall breach specifically affected customers using the MySonicWall cloud backup service. Organizations that maintain local-only firewall configurations and don't utilize SonicWall's cloud backup features were not directly impacted by the configuration file theft. However, all SonicWall customers should ensure they have applied patches for CVE-2024-40766 and other known vulnerabilities.
What legal action is Marquis taking against SonicWall?
Marquis has indicated they are evaluating options with respect to SonicWall, including seeking recoupment of expenses incurred due to the incident. The company has not specified whether formal legal proceedings have been initiated, but they are exploring potential avenues for recovering costs related to the breach investigation, customer notification, and remediation efforts.
How can organizations protect against similar supply chain attacks?
Organizations should implement multiple defensive layers including vendor risk assessments, contractual security requirements for third-party services, monitoring of cloud service provider security bulletins, and incident response procedures that account for supply chain compromises. Recent incidents like Ingram Micro's ransomware attack and ransomware attacks on major firms demonstrate the importance of maintaining defense-in-depth strategies that ensure single points of failure in vendor services don't compromise entire security postures. Organizations should also stay informed about emerging threats, such as new ransomware techniques being adopted by threat actors.
fluxsec.red/ - Discover the project plan for building Sanctum, an open-source EDR in Rust. Learn about the features, milestones, and challenges in developing an effective EDR and AV system.
Sanctum is an experimental proof-of-concept EDR, designed to detect modern malware techniques, above and beyond the capabilities of antivirus.
Sanctum is going to be an EDR, built in Rust, designed to perform the job of both an antivirus (AV) and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). It is no small feat building an EDR, and I am somewhat anxious about the path ahead; but you have to start somewhere and I’m starting with a blog post. If nothing else, this series will help me convey my own development and learning, as well as keep me motivated to keep working on this - all too often with personal projects I start something and then jump to the next shiny thing I think of. If you are here to learn something, hopefully I can impart some knowledge through this process.
I plan to build this EDR also around offensive techniques I’m demonstrating for this blog, hopefully to show how certain attacks could be stopped or detected - or it may be I can’t figure out a way to stop the attack! Either way, it will be fun!
Project rework
Originally, I was going to write the Windows Kernel Driver in Rust, but the bar for Rust Windows Driver development seemed quite high. I then swapped to C, realised how much I missed Rust, and swapped back to Rust!
So this Windows Driver will be fully written in Rust, both the driver and usermode module.
Why Rust for driver development?
Traditionally, drivers have been written in C & C++. While it might seem significantly easier to write this project in C, as an avid Rust enthusiast, I found myself longing for Rust’s features and safety guarantees. Writing in C or C++ made me miss the modern tooling and expressive power that Rust provides.
Thanks to Rust’s ability to operate in embedded and kernel development environments through libcore no_std, and with Microsoft’s support for developing drivers in Rust, Rust comes up as an excellent candidate for a “safer” approach to driver development. I use “safer” in quotes because, despite Rust’s safety guarantees, we still need to interact with unsafe APIs within the operating system. However, Rust’s stringent compile-time checks and ownership model significantly reduce the likelihood of common programming errors & vulnerabilities. I saw a statistic somewhere recently that some funky Rust kernels or driver modules were only like 5% unsafe code, I much prefer the safety of that than writing something which is 100% unsafe!
With regards to safety, even top tier C programmers will make occasional mistakes in their code; I am not a top tier C programmer (far from it!), so for me, the guarantee of a safer driver is much more appealing! The runtime guarantees you get with a Rust program (i.e. no access violations, dangling pointers, use after free’s [unless in those limited unsafe scopes]) are welcomed. Rust really is a great language.
The Windows Driver Kit (WDK) crate ecosystem provides essential tools that make driver development in Rust more accessible. With these crates, we can easily manage heap memory and utilize familiar Rust idioms like println!(). The maintainers of these crates have done a fantastic job bridging the gap between Rust and Windows kernel development.
BRASILIA, July 2 (Reuters) - Brazil's central bank said on Wednesday that technology services provider C&M Software, which serves financial institutions lacking connectivity infrastructure, had reported a cyberattack on its systems.
The bank did not provide further details of the attack, but said in a statement that it ordered C&M to shut down financial institutions' access to the infrastructure it operates.
C&M Software commercial director Kamal Zogheib said the company was a direct victim of the cyberattack, which involved the fraudulent use of client credentials in an attempt to access its systems and services.
C&M said critical systems remain intact and fully operational, adding that all security protocol measures had been implemented. The company is cooperating with the central bank and the Sao Paulo state police in the ongoing investigation, added Zogheib.
Brazilian financial institution BMP told Reuters that it and five other institutions experienced unauthorized access to their reserve accounts during the attack, which took place on Monday.
BMP said the affected accounts are held directly at the central bank and used exclusively for interbank settlement, with no impact on client accounts or internal balances.
On May 29, 2025, SentinelOne experienced a global service disruption affecting multiple customer-facing services. During this period, customer endpoints remained protected, but security teams were unable to access the management console and related services, which significantly impacted their ability to manage their security operations and access important data. We apologize for the disruption caused by this service interruption.
The root cause of the disruption was a software flaw in an infrastructure control system that removed critical network routes, causing widespread loss of network connectivity within the SentinelOne platform. It was not a security-related event. The majority of SentinelOne services experienced full or partial downtime due to this sudden loss of network connectivity to critical components in all regions.
We’d like to assure our commercial customers that their endpoints were protected throughout the duration of the service disruption and that no SentinelOne security data was lost during the event. Protected endpoint systems themselves did not experience downtime due to this incident. A core design principle of the SentinelOne architecture is to ensure protection and prevention capabilities continue uninterrupted without constant cloud connectivity or human dependency for detection and response – even in the case of service interruptions, of any kind, including events like this one.
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A "multi-faceted campaign" has been observed abusing legitimate services like GitHub and FileZilla to deliver an array of stealer malware and banking trojans such as Atomic (aka AMOS), Vidar, Lumma (aka LummaC2), and Octo by impersonating credible software like 1Password, Bartender 5, and Pixelmator Pro.
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#attacks #breach #computer #cyber #data #hack #hacker #hacking #how #information #malware #network #news #ransomware #security #software #the #to #today #updates #vulnerability
Ledger's software got hit with a serious security problem. banteg, a well-known crypto guy, tweeted that Ledger's library is messed up and now has a "drainer" in it.
Hyundai says it will set up “mobile clinics” at five U.S. locations to provide anti-theft software upgrades for vehicles now regularly targeted by thieves using a technique popularized on TikTok and other social platforms.
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Our team is tracking in-the-wild exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities against PaperCut MF/NG which allow for unauthenticated remote code execution due to an authentication bypass.
UPDATE: A new statement(Opens in a new window) from MSI says users should avoid downloading firmware and BIOS updates from third-party sources, and instead only obtain such software from the company's official website.
The statement suggests MSI is worried hackers could circulate malicious versions of the company's BIOS software when the ransomware gang, Money Message, claims it stole the PC maker's source code.
The 3CX VoIP Desktop Application has been compromised to deliver malware via legitimate 3CX updates. Huntress has been investigating this incident and working to validate and assess the current supply chain threat to the security community.
Markets have imposed “inadequate costs” on companies that build vulnerable technology, it says.
Gone in 60 seconds using a USB-A plug and brute force instead of a key
