seclists.org
From: Simon Josefsson <simon () josefsson org>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 15:00:07 +0100
If you are tired of modern age vulnerabilities, and remember the good
old times on bugtraq, I hope you will appreciate this one. If someone
can allocated a CVE, we will add it in future release notes.
/Simon
The telnetd server invokes /usr/bin/login (normally running as root)
passing the value of the USER environment variable received from the
client as the last parameter.
If the client supply a carefully crafted USER environment value being
the string "-f root", and passes the telnet(1) -a or --login parameter
to send this USER environment to the server, the client will be
automatically logged in as root bypassing normal authentication
processes.
This happens because the telnetd server do not sanitize the USER
environment variable before passing it on to login(1), and login(1)
uses the -f parameter to by-pass normal authentication.
Severity: High
Vulnerable versions: GNU InetUtils since version 1.9.3 up to and
including version 2.7.
On a Trisquel GNU/Linux 11 aramo laptop:
root@kaka:~ sudo apt-get install inetutils-telnetd telnet
root@kaka:~ sudo sed -i 's/#<off># telnet/telnet/' /etc/inetd.conf
root@kaka:~ sudo /etc/init.d/inetutils-inetd start
root@kaka:~ USER='-f root' telnet -a localhost
...
root@kaka:~#
The bug was introduced in the following commit made on 2015 March 19:
https://codeberg.org/inetutils/inetutils/commit/fa3245ac8c288b87139a0da8249d0a408c4dfb87
Based on mailing list discussions:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-inetutils/2014-12/msg00012.html
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-inetutils/2015-03/msg00001.html
It was included in the v1.9.3 release made on 2015 May 12.
Do not run a telnetd server at all. Restrict network access to the
telnet port to trusted clients.
Apply the patch or upgrade to a newer release which incorporate the
patch.
Disable telnetd server or make the InetUtils telnetd use a custom
login(1) tool that does not permit use of the '-f' parameter.
The template for invoking login(1) is in telnetd/telnetd.c:
/* Template command line for invoking login program. */
char *login_invocation =
#ifdef SOLARIS10
/* TODO: `-s telnet' or `-s ktelnet'.
* `-u' takes the Kerberos principal name
* of the authenticating, remote user.
*/
PATH_LOGIN " -p -h %h %?T{-t %T} -d %L %?u{-u %u}{%U}"
#elif defined SOLARIS
/* At least for SunOS 5.8. */
PATH_LOGIN " -h %h %?T{%T} %?u{-- %u}{%U}"
#else /* !SOLARIS */
PATH_LOGIN " -p -h %h %?u{-f %u}{%U}"
#endif
;
The variable expansion happens in telnetd/utility.c:
/* Expand a variable referenced by its short one-symbol name.
Input: exp->cp points to the variable name.
FIXME: not implemented */
char *
_var_short_name (struct line_expander *exp)
{
char *q;
char timebuf[64];
time_t t;
switch (*exp->cp++)
{
case 'a':
#ifdef AUTHENTICATION
if (auth_level >= 0 && autologin == AUTH_VALID)
return xstrdup ("ok");
#endif
return NULL;
case 'd':
time (&t);
strftime (timebuf, sizeof (timebuf),
"%l:%M%p on %A, %d %B %Y", localtime (&t));
return xstrdup (timebuf);
case 'h':
return xstrdup (remote_hostname);
case 'l':
return xstrdup (local_hostname);
case 'L':
return xstrdup (line);
case 't':
q = strchr (line + 1, '/');
if (q)
q++;
else
q = line;
return xstrdup (q);
case 'T':
return terminaltype ? xstrdup (terminaltype) : NULL;
case 'u':
return user_name ? xstrdup (user_name) : NULL;
case 'U':
return getenv ("USER") ? xstrdup (getenv ("USER")) : xstrdup ("");
default:
exp->state = EXP_STATE_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
}
Thus there is potential for similar vulnerabilities for other
variables.
On non-GNU/Linux systems, only the remote hostname field is of
interest. The remote_hostname variable is populated in the function
telnetd_setup from telnetd/telnetd.c by calling getnameinfo() or
gethostbyaddr() depending on platform. This API is generally not
considered to return trusted data, thus relying on it to not return a
value such as 'foo -f root' is not advisable.
We chose to sanitize all variables for expansion. The following two
patches are what we suggest:
https://codeberg.org/inetutils/inetutils/commit/fd702c02497b2f398e739e3119bed0b23dd7aa7b
https://codeberg.org/inetutils/inetutils/commit/ccba9f748aa8d50a38d7748e2e60362edd6a32cc
This vulnerability was found and reported by Kyu Neushwaistein aka
Carlos Cortes Alvarez on 2026-01-19.
Initial patch by Paul Eggert on 2026-01-20. Simon Josefsson improved
the patch to also cover similar concerns with other expansions.
This advisory was drafted by Simon Josefsson on 2026-01-20.
Ivanti has released security updates for its Neurons for ITSM IT service management solution that mitigate a critical authentication bypass vulnerability.
Tracked as CVE-2025-22462, the security flaw can let unauthenticated attackers gain administrative access to unpatched systems in low-complexity attacks, depending on system configuration.
As the company highlighted in a security advisory released today, organizations that followed its guidance are less exposed to attacks.
"Customers who have followed Ivanti's guidance on securing the IIS website and restricted access to a limited number of IP addresses and domain names have a reduced risk to their environment," Ivanti said.
"Customers who have users log into the solution from outside their company network also have a reduced risk to their environment if they ensure that the solution is configured with a DMZ."
Ivanti added that CVE-2025-22462 only impacts on-premises instances running versions 2023.4, 2024.2, 2024.3, and earlier, and said that it found no evidence that the vulnerability is being exploited to target customers.
Product Name Affected Version(s) Resolved Version(s)
Ivanti Neurons for ITSM (on-prem only) 2023.4, 2024.2, and 2024.3 2023.4 May 2025 Security Patch
2024.2 May 2025 Security Patch
2024.3 May 2025 Security Patch
The company also urged customers today to patch a default credentials security flaw (CVE-2025-22460) in its Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) that can let local authenticated attackers escalate privileges on vulnerable systems.
While this vulnerability isn't exploited in the wild either, Ivanti warned that the patch won't be applied correctly after installing today's security updates and asked admins to reinstall from scratch or use these mitigation steps to ensure their network is protected from potential attacks.
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation
CVE-2025-3248 Langflow Missing Authentication Vulnerability
These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
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On 18 November 2024, Palo Alto Networks issued a security advisory for an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PAN-OS management web interface. The vulnerability is tracked under CVE-2024-0012 [1] and has a CVSS score for this is 9.3 [2]. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the management web interface to gain PAN-OS administrator privileges. As the Northwave CERT has already observed mass exploitation by multiple threat actors, we urge all recipients to implement mitigation measures and patch their systems.
Google says it recently fixed an authentication weakness that allowed crooks to circumvent the email verification required to create a Google Workspace account, and leverage that to impersonate a domain holder at third-party services that allow logins through Google’s “Sign in with Google” feature.
Cisco said one of the providers it uses to send multifactor authentication (MFA) messages was breached by a threat actor on April 1.
In emails to customers, Cisco said the incident specifically affected Duo — a multifactor authentication company it acquired in 2018. The attacker breached the system of a telephony supplier that Duo uses to send MFA messages through texts and phone calls to its customers.
A new study by Juniper Research has found operators will generate $27 billion from the termination of SMS messages related to multi-factor authentication in 2022; an increase from $25 billion in 2021. The research predicts this 5% growth will be driven by increased pressure on digital service providers to offer secure authentication that reduces risk of data breaches and protects user identity. Multi-factor authentication combines multiple credentials to verify a user or transaction. This includes sending an SMS that contains a one‑time password or code to a user’s unique phone number.