Following major public exposures by Insikt Group and others throughout the last two years, alongside US government sanctions targeting the Intellexa Consortium — the organizational structure behind the Predator mobile spyware — Insikt Group observed a significant decline in Predator-related activity. This apparent decline raised questions about whether the combination of US sanctions, public exposure, and broader international efforts to curb spyware proliferation, such as the UK and France-led Pall Mall process, had dealt a lasting blow to Intellexa’s operations. Yet, Predator activity has not stopped, and in recent months, Insikt Group has observed a resurgence of activity, reflecting the operators’ continued persistence. While much of the identified infrastructure is tied to known Predator operators in countries previously identified by Insikt Group, a new customer has also been identified in Mozambique — a country not previously publicly linked to the spyware. This aligns with the broader observation that Predator is highly active in Africa, with over half of its identified customers located on the continent. Additionally, Insikt Group has found a connection between high-tier Predator infrastructure and a Czech entity previously associated with the Intellexa Consortium.
CISA and the FBI said attackers deploying Ghost ransomware have breached victims from multiple industry sectors across over 70 countries, including critical infrastructure organizations.
#CISA #Computer #Cring #Critical #FBI #Ghost #InfoSec #Infrastructure #Ransomware #Security
Massive ‘Typhoon’ cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure and telecoms sought to lay groundwork for potential conflict with Beijing, as intruders gathered data and got in position to impede response and sow chaos
This guide provides network engineers and defenders of communications infrastructure with best practices to strengthen their visibility and harden their network
Ukrainian hackers carried out a cyberattack that took down online broadcasts of Russian state television and radio channels on Monday, according to an official in Kyiv with knowledge of the operation.
#A #Dmitry #Emerging #Europe #Infrastructure #Markets #Media #Peskov #Putin #Radio #Russia #Ukraine #Vladimir #business #cybersecni #cybersecurity #politics #technology
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and National Security Agency (NSA) assess that cyber actors affiliated with the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155) are responsible for computer network operations against global targets for the purposes of espionage, sabotage, and reputational harm since at least 2020. GRU Unit 29155 cyber actors began deploying the destructive WhisperGate malware against multiple Ukrainian victim organizations as early as January 13, 2022. These cyber actors are separate from other known and more established GRU-affiliated cyber groups, such as Unit 26165 and Unit 74455.
The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned a Wuhan-based company used by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) as cover in attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure organizations.
#APT31 #China #Computer #Critical #InfoSec #Infrastructure #Sanctions #Security #USA
This blog post seeks to draw out some high-level trends and anomalies based on our ongoing tracking of QakBot command and control (C2) infrastructure. By looking at the data with a broader scope, we hope to supplement other research into this particular threat family, which in general focuses on specific infrastructure elements; e.g., daily alerting on active C2 servers.
Canada's domestic food production system may actually be one of the most glaring cracks in Canada's national defences.
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Attacking agricultural infrastructure has proven to be an effective part of the Russian playbook so far in its invasion of Ukraine. In June 2022, EU trade counsellor Maud Labat said Moscow has figured out how to wield food as a “geopolitical weapon.”
Summary Three key takeaways from our analysis of Vidar infrastructure: Russian VPN gateways are potentially providing anonymity for Vidar operators / customers, making it more challenging for analysts to have a complete overview of this threat. These gateways now appear to be migrating to Tor. Vidar operators appear to be expanding their infrastructure, so analysts need to keep them in their sights. We expect a new wave of customers and as a result, an increase of campaigns in the upcoming weeks