Threat actors are advancing AI strategies and outpacing traditional security. CXOs must critically examine AI weaponization across the attack chain.
The integration of AI into adversarial operations is fundamentally reshaping the speed, scale and sophistication of attacks. As AI defense capabilities evolve, so do the AI strategies and tools leveraged by threat actors, creating a rapidly shifting threat landscape that outpaces traditional detection and response methods. This accelerating evolution necessitates a critical examination for CXOs into how threat actors will strategically weaponize AI across each phase of the attack chain.
One of the most alarming shifts we have seen, following the introduction of AI technologies, is the dramatic drop in mean time to exfiltrate (MTTE) data, following initial access. In 2021, the average MTTE stood at nine days. According to our Unit 42 2025 Global Incident Response Report, by 2024 MTTE dropped to two days. In one in five cases, the time from compromise to exfiltration was less than 1 hour.
In our testing, Unit 42 was able to simulate a ransomware attack (from initial compromise to data exfiltration) in just 25 minutes using AI at every stage of the attack chain. That’s a 100x increase in speed, powered entirely by AI.
Recent threat activity observed by Unit 42 has highlighted how adversaries are leveraging AI in attacks:
On April 24, 2025, SAP disclosed CVE-2025-31324, a critical vulnerability with a CVSS score of 10.0 affecting the SAP NetWeaver's Visual Composer Framework, version 7.50.
CVE-2025-31324 is a critical vulnerability residing in the SAP NetWeaver Application Server Java's Visual Composer component (VCFRAMEWORK). While not installed by default, business analysts commonly use this component to create applications without coding, making it widely present in SAP deployments.
The core issue with this vulnerability is a missing authorization check in the Metadata Uploader, accessible via the /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint. This means that any user, even unauthenticated ones, can interact with this endpoint and upload arbitrary files to the server.
Here's a breakdown of how the vulnerability works:
Unrestricted access: The /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint is exposed over HTTP/HTTPS and lacks proper authentication or authorization controls.
Malicious file upload: An attacker can send a specially crafted HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint, containing a malicious file as the request body.
File system access: Due to the missing authorization check, the server accepts the attacker's request and writes the uploaded file to the server's file system. The file is often written to a location within the web application's accessible directories (e.g., under /irj/servlet_jsp/irj/root/).
Web shell execution (common scenario): If the attacker uploads a web shell like a Java server page (JSP) file, the attacker can then access the web shell via a web browser. Now residing on the server, this web shell allows an attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the SAP application server process.
System compromise: With the ability to execute commands as an SAP system administrator (system account name: sidadm), an attacker effectively gains control of the SAP system and its associated data. The attacker can then perform various malicious activities.
CVE-2025-31324 allows attackers to bypass security controls and directly upload and execute malicious files on vulnerable SAP servers, potentially leading to complete system compromise. The ease of exploitation (no authentication required) and the possibility for high impact make this a critical vulnerability that requires immediate attention and remediation.
Discover recent attacks using Lynx ransomware, a rebrand of INC, targeting multiple crucial sectors in the U.S. and UK with prevalent double-extortion tactics. Discover recent attacks using Lynx ransomware, a rebrand of INC, targeting multiple crucial sectors in the U.S. and UK with prevalent double-extortion tactics.
Unit 42 researchers have discovered that the Muddled Libra group now actively targets software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications and cloud service provider (CSP) environments. Organizations often store a variety of data in SaaS applications and use services from CSPs. The threat actors have begun attempting to leverage some of this data to assist with their attack progression, and to use for extortion when trying to monetize their work.
We unravel the details of two large-scale StrelaStealer campaigns from 2023 and 2024. This email credential stealer has a new variant delivered through zipped JScript.
#2024 #Campaign #EN #JScript #StrelaStealer #analysis #paloaltonetworks
On May 31, Progress Software posted a notification alerting customers of a critical Structured Query Language injection (SQLi) vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362) in their MOVEit Transfer product. MOVEit Transfer is a managed file transfer (MFT) application intended to provide secure collaboration and automated file transfers of sensitive data.
Unit 42 researchers examine several malware samples that incorporate Cobalt Strike components, and discuss some of the ways that we catch these samples by analyzing artifacts from the deltas in process memory at key points of execution. We will also discuss the evasion tactics used by these threats, and other issues that make their analysis problematic.
Understanding banking Trojan techniques can help detect other activities of financially motivated threat groups.