Using an AI powered network traffic analysis tool we built called SIFT, GreyNoise has caught multiple anomalous network payloads with zero-effort that are attempting to disable TrendMicro security features in ASUS routers, then exploit vulnerabilities and novel tradecraft in ASUS AiProtection features on those routers.
Irony? Top Score. You love to see it.
Note: This activity was first discovered by GreyNoise on March 18, 2025. Public disclosure was deferred as we coordinated the findings with government and industry partners.
In summary, we are observing an ongoing wave of exploitation targeting ASUS routers, combining both old and new attack methods. After an initial wave of generic brute-force attacks targeting login.cgi, we observe subsequent attempts exploiting older authentication bypass vulnerabilities. Using either of the above methods to gain privileged access to ASUS hardware, we observe payloads exploiting a command injection vulnerability to create an empty file at /tmp/BWSQL_LOG. This existence of a file at this path enables BWDPI logging, a TrendMicro feature embedded in ASUS routers.
Finally, we see remote SSH enabled on a high port TCP/53282 through the official ASUS settings with an attacker controlled public key added to the router’s keyring. This grants the attacker exclusive SSH access. Additionally, because the backdoor is part of the official ASUS settings, it will persist across firmware upgrades, even after the original vulnerability used to gain access has been patched.
The attacker controlled pubkey that is added is:
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAo41nBoVFfj4HlVMGV+YPsxMDrMlbdDZJ8L5mzhhaxfGzpHR8Geay/xDlVDSJ8MJwA4RJ7o21KVfRXqFblQH4L6fWIYd1ClQbZ6Kk1uA1r7qx1qEQ2PqdVMhnNdHACvCVz/MPHTVebtkKhEl98MZiMOvUNPtAC9ppzOSi7xz3cSV0n1pG/dj+37pzuZUpm4oGJ3XQR2tUPz5MddupjJq9/gmKH6SJjTrHKSECe5yEDs6c3v6uN4dnFNYA5MPZ52FGbkhzQ5fy4dPNf0peszR28XGkZk9ctORNCGXZZ4bEkGHYut5uvwVK1KZOYJRmmj63drEgdIioFv/x6IcCcKgi2w== rsa 2048
You can find an actively growing list of backdoored hosts here: Censys Search. This list provides detailed information on hosts with the backdoor in question.
Now let’s go threat hunting!
👋 botnet operator, we were watching.
GreyNoise uncovers a stealth campaign exploiting ASUS routers, enabling persistent backdoor access via CVE-2023-39780 and unpatched techniques. Learn how attackers evade detection, how GreyNoise discovered it with AI-powered tooling, and what defenders need to know.
This activity was first discovered by GreyNoise on March 18, 2025. Public disclosure was deferred as we coordinated the findings with government and industry partners.
GreyNoise has identified an ongoing exploitation campaign in which attackers have gained unauthorized, persistent access to thousands of ASUS routers exposed to the internet. This appears to be part of a stealth operation to assemble a distributed network of backdoor devices — potentially laying the groundwork for a future botnet.
The tactics used in this campaign — stealthy initial access, use of built-in system features for persistence, and careful avoidance of detection — are consistent with those seen in advanced, long-term operations, including activity associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) actors and operational relay box (ORB) networks. While GreyNoise has made no attribution, the level of tradecraft suggests a well-resourced and highly capable adversary.
The attacker’s access survives both reboots and firmware updates, giving them durable control over affected devices. The attacker maintains long-term access without dropping malware or leaving obvious traces by chaining authentication bypasses, exploiting a known vulnerability, and abusing legitimate configuration features.
The activity was uncovered by Sift — GreyNoise’s proprietary AI-powered network payload analysis tool — in combination with fully emulated ASUS router profiles running in the GreyNoise Global Observation Grid. These tools enabled us to detect subtle exploitation attempts buried in global traffic and reconstruct the full attack sequence.
Read the full technical analysis.
Timeline of Events
March 17, 2025: GreyNoise’s proprietary AI technology, Sift, observes anomalous traffic.
March 18, 2025: GreyNoise researchers become aware of Sift report and begin investigating.
March 23, 2025: Disclosure deferred as we coordinated the findings with government and industry partners.
May 22, 2025: Sekoia announces compromise of ASUS routers as part of ‘ViciousTrap.’
May 28, 2025: GreyNoise publishes this blog.
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