Quotidien Shaarli

In this research, we uncovered several vulnerabilities and security flaws within the Prometheus ecosystem. These findings span across three major areas: information disclosure, denial-of-service (DoS), and code execution. We found that exposed Prometheus servers or exporters, often lacking proper authentication, allowed attackers to easily gather sensitive information, such as credentials and API keys.
Additionally, we identified an alarming risk of DoS attacks stemming from the exposure of pprof debugging endpoints, which, when exploited, could overwhelm and crash Prometheus servers, Kubernetes pods and other hosts.

• Socks5Systemz, identified last year during large-scale distribution campaigns involving Privateloader, Smokeloader, and Amadey, has actually been active since 2013.
• This malware was sold as a standalone product or integrated into other malware as a SOCKS5 proxy module. Such malware included, at least, Andromeda, Smokeloader and Trickbot.
• In recent months, Bitsight TRACE investigated a Socks5Systemz botnet with 250,000 compromised systems at its peak, geographically dispersed across almost every country in the world.
• The proxy service PROXY.AM, active since 2016, exploits the botnet to provide its users with proxy exit nodes and enable them to pursue broader criminal objectives.

• Akamai security researcher Tomer Peled explored new ways to use and abuse Microsoft's UI Automation framework and discovered an attack technique that evades endpoint detection and response (EDR).

• To exploit this technique, a user must be convinced to run a program that uses UI Automation. This can lead to stealthy command execution, which can harvest sensitive data, redirect browsers to phishing websites, and more.

• Detection of this technique is challenging in several ways, including for EDR. All EDR technologies we have tested against this technique were unable to find any malicious activity.

• This technique can be used on every Windows endpoint with operating system XP and above.

• In this blog post, we provide a full write-up on how to (ab)use the UI Automation framework (including possible attacks that could leverage it) and we present a proof of concept (PoC) for each abuse vector we discuss. We also provide detection and mitigation options.

• In this post, we describe our in-depth investigation into a threat actor to which we have assigned the identifier MUT-1244.
• MUT-1224 uses two initial access vectors to compromise their victims, both leveraging the same second-stage payload: a *phishing campaign targeting thousands of academic researchers and a large number of trojanized GitHub repositories, such as proof-of-concept code for exploiting known CVEs.
• Over 390,000 credentials, believed to be for WordPress accounts, have been exfiltrated to the threat actor through the malicious code in the trojanized "yawpp" GitHub project, masquerading as a WordPress credentials checker.
• Hundreds of victims of MUT-1244 were and are still being compromised. Victims are believed to be offensive actors—including pentesters and security researchers, as well as malicious threat actors— and had sensitive data such as SSH private keys and AWS access keys exfiltrated.
• We assess that MUT-1244 has overlap with a campaign tracked in previous research reported on the malicious npm package 0xengine/xmlrpc and the malicious GitHub repository hpc20235/yawpp.

Oasis Security's research team uncovered a critical vulnerability in Microsoft's Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) implementation, allowing attackers to bypass it and gain unauthorized access to the user’s account, including Outlook emails, OneDrive files, Teams chats, Azure Cloud, and more. Microsoft has more than 400 million paid Office 365 seats, making the consequences of this vulnerability far-reaching.

The bypass was simple: it took around an hour to execute, required no user interaction and did not generate any notification or provide the account holder with any indication of trouble.

L'administration fédérale doit avoir son propre service en nuage souverain. Suivant le National, le Conseil des Etats a accepté jeudi à l'unanimité un crédit de 246,9 millions de francs pour le "Swiss Governement Cloud" (SGC).