Quotidien Hebdomadaire Mensuel

Quotidien Shaarli

Tous les liens d'un jour sur une page.

April 28, 2025

Introducing ToyMaker, an initial access broker working in cahoots with double extortion gangs

Cisco Talos discovered a sophisticated attack on critical infrastructure by ToyMaker and Cactus, using the LAGTOY backdoor to orchestrate a relentless double extortion scheme.

  • In 2023, Cisco Talos discovered an extensive compromise in a critical infrastructure enterprise consisting of a combination of threat actors.
  • From initial access to double extortion, these actors slowly and steadily compromised a multitude of hosts in the network using a combination of various dual-use remote administration, SSH and file transfer tools.
  • The initial access broker (IAB), whom Talos calls “ToyMaker” and assesses with medium confidence is a financially motivated threat actor, exploits vulnerable systems exposed to the internet. They deploy their custom-made backdoor we call “LAGTOY” and extract credentials from the victim enterprise. LAGTOY can be used to create reverse shells and execute commands on infected endpoints.
  • A compromise by LAGTOY may result in access handover to a secondary threat actor. Specifically, we’ve observed ToyMaker handover access to Cactus, a double extortion gang who employed their own tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to carry out malicious actions across the victim’s network.
Navigating Through The Fog
  • An open directory associated with a ransomware affiliate, likely linked to the Fog ransomware group, was discovered in December 2024. It contained tools and scripts for reconnaissance, exploitation, lateral movement, and persistence.
  • Initial access was gained using compromised SonicWall VPN credentials, while other offensive tools facilitated credential theft, exploitation of Active Directory vulnerabilities, and lateral movement.
  • Persistence was maintained through AnyDesk, automated by a PowerShell script that preconfigured remote access credentials.
  • Sliver C2 executables were hosted on the server for command-and-control operations, alongside Proxychains tunneling.
  • The victims spanned multiple industries, including technology, education, and logistics, across Europe, North America, and South America, highlighting the affiliate’s broad targeting scope.