Arctic Wolf has observed exploitation in the wild of CVE-2024-7399 in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server—a CMS used to manage and remotely control digital signage displays.
As of early May 2025, Arctic Wolf has observed exploitation in the wild of CVE-2024-7399 in Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server—a content management system (CMS) used to manage and remotely control digital signage displays. The vulnerability allows for arbitrary file writing by unauthenticated users, and may ultimately lead to remote code execution when the vulnerability is used to write specially crafted JavaServer Pages (JSP) files.
This high-severity vulnerability had originally been made public by Samsung in August 2024 following responsible disclosure by security researchers, with no exploitation reported at the time. On April 30, 2025, a new research article was published along with technical details and a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit. Exploitation was then observed within days of that publication.
Given the low barrier to exploitation and the availability of a public PoC, threat actors are likely to continue targeting this vulnerability. Arctic Wolf will continue to monitor for malicious post-compromise activities related to this vulnerability, and will alert Managed Detection and Response customers as required when malicious activities are observed.
29.04.2025 - L’Office fédéral de la cybersécurité (OFCS) observe une vague de tentatives de fraude au PDG qui perdure. La semaine dernière, de nombreux cas ont été signalés à l’OFCS dans lesquels des cybercriminels se font passer pour des dirigeants de communes afin d’inciter des employé/e/s à acheter des cartes cadeaux ou à effectuer des virements. La rétrospective hebdomadaire examine le modus operandi des cybercriminels, explique pourquoi les communes sont particulièrement exposées et donne des conseils pour que les communes (et toutes les autres victimes potentielles) puissent se protéger.
En raison de leur structure publique et de la disponibilité des informations sur les sites municipaux, les communes constituent une cible attractive pour les tentatives de fraude au PDG. Ces dernières semaines, de nombreux cas de ce type ont été signalés à l’OFCS. Les méthodes utilisées par les escrocs sont décrites ci-après, en particulier les deux procédures consistant soit à exiger des cartes cadeaux, soit à insister pour obtenir un paiement direct.
The open source software easyjson is used by the US government and American companies. But its ties to Russia’s VK, whose CEO has been sanctioned, have researchers sounding the alarm.
Security researchers warn that a popular open source tool maintained by Russian developers could pose significant risks to US national security.
Key Points:
The open source tool easyjson is linked to VK Group, a company run by a sanctioned Russian executive.
easyjson is widely used in the US across various critical sectors including defense, finance, and healthcare.
Concerns are heightened due to the potential for data theft and cyberattacks stemming from this software.
*Recent findings from cybersecurity researchers at Hunted Labs indicate that easyjson, a code serialization tool for the Go programming language, is at the center of a national security alert. This tool, which has been integrated into multiple sectors such as the US Department of Defense, is maintained by a group of Russian developers linked to VK Group, led by Vladimir Kiriyenko. While the complete codebase appears secure, the geopolitical context surrounding its management raises substantial concerns about the potential risks involved.
The significance of easyjson cannot be overstated, as it serves as a foundational element within the cloud-native ecosystem, critical for operations across various platforms. With connections to a sanctioned CEO and the broader backdrop of Russian state-backed cyberattacks, the fear is that easyjson could be manipulated to conduct espionage or potentially compromise critical infrastructures. Such capabilities underscore the pressing need for independent evaluations and potential reevaluations of software supply chains, particularly when foreign entities are involved.
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation
CVE-2025-3248 Langflow Missing Authentication Vulnerability
These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
La Confédération n'avait pas établi de distinction entre les fournisseurs de services de communication dérivés. Toutes les entreprises classées comme FSDC sont soumises à des obligations de coopération moins strictes – jusqu'à présent. Le Conseil fédéral souhaite désormais introduire une catégorisation plus précise pour les FSDC. Il prévoit à cet effet un modèle à trois niveaux, à savoir les FSDC avec des obligations «minimales», avec des obligations «restreintes» et avec des obligations «complètes».
Une révision partielle des ordonnances relatives au service de surveillance de la correspondance postale et des télécommunications (service SCPT) fait des remous dans le secteur technologique suisse. La pierre d'achoppement est une nouvelle classification des entreprises qui doivent aider le service SCPT dans ses activités de surveillance.
Jusqu'à présent, la Confédération faisait la distinction entre les fournisseurs de services de télécommunication (FST) et les fournisseurs de services de communication dérivés (FSDC), selon un communiqué de la Confédération. La Confédération divisait également les FST en deux sous-catégories, à savoir ceux les FST ayant des obligations complètes et les FST ayant des obligations restreintes.
Trois nouveaux niveaux
La Confédération n'avait pas établi de distinction entre les fournisseurs de services de communication dérivés. Toutes les entreprises classées comme FSDC sont soumises à des obligations de coopération moins strictes – jusqu'à présent. Le Conseil fédéral souhaite désormais introduire une catégorisation plus précise pour les FSDC. Il prévoit à cet effet un modèle à trois niveaux, à savoir les FSDC avec des obligations «minimales», avec des obligations «restreintes» et avec des obligations «complètes».
DragonForce ransomware group is targeting major UK retailers. Learn about this evolving threat and what steps can be taken to mitigate risk.
In recent weeks, the DragonForce ransomware group has been targeting UK retailers in a series of coordinated attacks causing major service disruptions. Prominent retailers such as Harrods, Marks and Spencer, and the Co-Op have all reported ongoing incidents affecting payment systems, inventory, payroll and other critical business functions.
DragonForce has previously been attributed for a number of notable cyber incidents including attacks on Honolulu OTS (Oahu Transit Services), the Government of Palau, Coca-Cola (Singapore), the Ohio State Lottery, and Yakult Australia.
In this post, we offer a high-level overview of the DragonForce group, discuss its targeting, initial access methods, and payloads. We further provide a comprehensive list of indicators and defensive recommendations to help security teams and threat hunters better protect their organizations.
Background
DragonForce ransomware operations emerged in August 2023, primarily out of Malaysia (DragonForce Malaysia). The group originally positioned itself as a Pro-Palestine hacktivist-style operation; however, over time their goals have shifted and expanded.
The modern-day operation is focused on financial gain and extortion although the operation still targets government entities, making it something of a hybrid actor, both politically aligned and profit-motivated. The group operates a multi-extortion model, with victims threatened with data leakage via the group’s data leak sites, alongside reputational damage.
Recent DragonForce victims have included government institutions, commercial enterprises, and organizations aligned with specific political causes. The group is also known to heavily target law firms and medical practices. Notably, the group has targeted numerous entities in Israel, India, Saudi Arabia, and more recently several retail outlets in the United Kingdom.
Some components of the UK retail attacks have been attributed to an individual affiliated with the loose threat actor collective ‘The Com’, with claims that members are leveraging DragonForce ransomware. Our assessment indicates that the affiliate in question exhibits behavioral and operational characteristics consistent with those previously associated with The Com. However, due to the lack of strong technical evidence and shifting boundaries of The Com, that attribution remains inconclusive and subject to further analysis.
Multiple vendors were hacked in a coordinated supply chain attack, Sansec found 21 applications with the same backdoor. Curiously, the malware was injected 6 years ago, but came to life this week as attackers took full control of ecommerce servers. Sansec estimates that between 500 and 1000 stores are running backdoored software.
Hundreds of stores, including a $40 billion multinational, are running backdoored versions of popular ecommerce software. We found that the backdoor is actively used since at least April 20th. Sansec identified these backdoors in the following packages which were published between 2019 and 2022.
Vendor Package
Tigren Ajaxsuite
Tigren Ajaxcart
Tigren Ajaxlogin
Tigren Ajaxcompare
Tigren Ajaxwishlist
Tigren MultiCOD
Meetanshi ImageClean
Meetanshi CookieNotice
Meetanshi Flatshipping
Meetanshi FacebookChat
Meetanshi CurrencySwitcher
Meetanshi DeferJS
MGS Lookbook
MGS StoreLocator
MGS Brand
MGS GDPR
MGS Portfolio
MGS Popup
MGS DeliveryTime
MGS ProductTabs
MGS Blog
We established that Tigren, Magesolution (MGS) and Meetanshi servers have been breached and that attackers were able to inject backdoors on their download servers.
This hack is called a Supply Chain Attack, which is one of the worst types. By hacking these vendors, the attacker gained access to all of their customers' stores. And by proxy, to all of the customers that visit these stores.
We also found a backdoored version of the Weltpixel GoogleTagManager extension, but we have not been able to establish whether Weltpixel or these particular stores got compromised.
Research into a global phishing-as-a-service operation will take you through:
Hundreds of thousands of victims spanning the globe
A glimpse into the lifestyle of the operators
Technical insight into the phishing toolkit
The backend of a phishing threat actor operating at scale
The scam industry has seen explosive growth over the past several years. The types of scams and methods used are constantly evolving as scammers adapt their techniques to continue their activities. They often capitalise on new technologies and target areas where our societies have yet to build mechanisms to protect themselves.
This story begins in December 2023 when people all over the world – including a large portion of the Norwegian population - started to receive text messages about packages waiting for them at the post office. The messages would come in the form of an SMS, iMessage or RCS message. What we were witnessing was the rise of a scam technique known as smishing or SMS phishing.
Such messages have one thing in common: they impersonate a brand that we trust to create a credible context for soliciting some kind of personal information, thus tricking us into willfully giving away our information.
Some scams are easier to spot than others. Spelling errors, poor translations, strange numbers or links to sketchy domains often give them away. But even tell-tale signs can be easy to miss on a busy day. When a large number of people are targeted, some will be expecting a package. And the tactic is obviously working. If it wasn’t worth their while, the scammers wouldn’t have invested so much time, money and effort.
StealC V2 enhances information stealing, introduces RC4 encryption, and provides a new control panel for more targeted payloads.
StealC is a popular information stealer and malware downloader that has been sold since January 2023. In March 2025, StealC version 2 (V2) was introduced with key updates, including a streamlined command-and-control (C2) communication protocol and the addition of RC4 encryption (in the latest variants). The malware’s payload delivery options have been expanded to include Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) packages and PowerShell scripts. A redesigned control panel provides an integrated builder that enables threat actors to customize payload delivery rules based on geolocation, hardware IDs (HWID), and installed software. Additional features include multi-monitor screenshot capture, a unified file grabber, and server-side brute-forcing for credentials.
This blog post focuses on the recent changes in StealC V2, describing the improvements in payload delivery, encryption, control panel functionality, and the updated communication protocol.
Key Takeaways
Kandji researchers uncovered and disclosed key macOS vulnerabilities over the past year. Learn how we protect customers through detection and patching.
When we discover weaknesses before attackers do, everyone wins. History has shown that vulnerabilities like Gatekeeper bypass and TCC bypass zero-days don't remain theoretical for long—both of these recent vulnerabilities were exploited in the wild by macOS malware. By investing heavily in new security research, we're helping strengthen macOS for everyone.
Once reported to Apple, the fix for these vulnerabilities is not always obvious. Depending on the complexity, it can take a few months to over a year, especially if it requires major architectural changes to the operating system. Apple’s vulnerability disclosure program has been responsive and effective.
Of course, we don't just report issues and walk away. We ensure our products can detect these vulnerabilities and protect our customers from potential exploitation while waiting for official patches.
TeleMessage, a company that makes a modified version of Signal that archives messages for government agencies, was hacked.
A hacker has breached and stolen customer data from TeleMessage, an obscure Israeli company that sells modified versions of Signal and other messaging apps to the U.S. government to archive messages, 404 Media has learned. The data stolen by the hacker contains the contents of some direct messages and group chats sent using its Signal clone, as well as modified versions of WhatsApp, Telegram, and WeChat. TeleMessage was recently the center of a wave of media coverage after Mike Waltz accidentally revealed he used the tool in a cabinet meeting with President Trump.
The hack shows that an app gathering messages of the highest ranking officials in the government—Waltz’s chats on the app include recipients that appear to be Marco Rubio, Tulsi Gabbard, and JD Vance—contained serious vulnerabilities that allowed a hacker to trivially access the archived chats of some people who used the same tool. The hacker has not obtained the messages of cabinet members, Waltz, and people he spoke to, but the hack shows that the archived chat logs are not end-to-end encrypted between the modified version of the messaging app and the ultimate archive destination controlled by the TeleMessage customer.
