EclecticIQ analysts assess with high confidence that, in April 2025, China-nexus nation-state APTs (advanced persistent threat) launched high-temp exploitation campaigns against critical infrastructure networks by targeting SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer. Actors leveraged CVE-2025-31324 [1], an unauthenticated file upload vulnerability that enables remote code execution (RCE). This assessment is based on a publicly exposed directory (opendir) found on attacker-controlled infrastructure, which contained detailed event logs capturing operations across multiple compromised systems.
EclecticIQ analysts link observed SAP NetWeaver intrusions to Chinese cyber-espionage units including UNC5221 [2], UNC5174 [3], and CL-STA-0048 [4] based on threat actor tradecrafts patterns. Mandiant and Palo Alto researchers assess that these groups connect to China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) or affiliated private entities. These actors operate strategically to compromise critical infrastructures, exfiltrate sensitive data, and maintain persistent access across high-value networks worldwide.
Uncategorized China-Nexus Threat Actor Scanning the Internet for CVE-2025-31324 and Upload Webshells
EclecticIQ analysts assess with high confidence that, a very likely China-nexus threat actor is conducting a widespread internet scanning and exploitation campaign against SAP NetWeaver systems. Threat actor–controlled server hosted at IP address 15.204.56[.]106 exposed the scope of the SAP NetWeaver intrusions [5].
Join Ido Kringel and the Deep Instinct Threat Research Team in this deep dive into a recently discovered, Office-based regex evasion technique
Microsoft Office-based attacks have long been a favored tactic amongst cybercriminals— and for good reason. Attackers frequently use Office documents in cyberattacks because they are widely trusted. These files, such as Word or Excel docs, are commonly exchanged in business and personal settings. They are also capable of carrying hidden malicious code, embedded macros, and external links that execute code when opened, especially if users are tricked into enabling features like macros.
Moreover, Office documents support advanced techniques like remote template injection, obfuscated macros, and legacy features like Excel 4.0 macros. These allow attackers to bypass antivirus detection and trigger multi-stage payloads such as ransomware or information-stealing malware.
Since Office files are familiar to users and often appear legitimate (e.g., invoices, resumes, or reports), they’re also highly effective tools in phishing and social engineering attacks.
This mixture of social credit and advanced attack characteristics unique to Office files, as well as compatibility across platforms and integration with scripting languages, makes them ideal for initiating sophisticated attacks with minimal user suspicion.
Last year, Microsoft announced the availability of three new functions that use Regular Expressions (regex) to help parse text more easily:
Regex are sequences of characters that define search patterns, primarily used for string matching and manipulation. They enable efficient text processing by allowing complex searches, replacements, and validations based on specific criteria.
Lors de sa séance du 14 mai 2025, le Conseil fédéral a été informé du contenu du premier rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la Cyberstratégie nationale (CSN), lequel documente l’état des travaux menés au niveau national pour renforcer la cybersécurité. Rédigé par le comité de pilotage de la CSN en collaboration avec l’Office fédéral de la cybersécurité (OFCS), il montre des progrès évidents : la création d’importantes structures de coordination, l’avancée de projets en cours et le lancement de nouveaux projets, sans compter le renforcement de la visibilité internationale de la Suisse dans le domaine de la cybersécurité.
Avec la CSN, la Confédération poursuit une approche globale visant à renforcer la cyberrésilience de la Suisse. Cinq objectifs stratégiques sont au cœur de cette démarche : la responsabilisation de la population, la sécurité des prestations numériques et des infrastructures critiques, la gestion et la défense contre les cyberattaques, la lutte contre la cybercriminalité, et la coopération internationale. Le rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la CSN montre des progrès évidents : la poursuite ciblée de projets en cours et le lancement de nouveaux projets dans les cinq objectifs stratégiques de la CSN.
Progrès concrets
Des mesures de sensibilisation et de promotion de la recherche et de la formation sont venues renforcer les compétences de la population, des entreprises et des autorités dans le traitement des cybermenaces. La campagne « S-U-P-E-R.ch » menée en 2024 et la participation de la Suisse au « European Cyber Security Month » ont contribué à sensibiliser le grand public aux thèmes liés à la cybersécurité.
La stratégie continue d’être axée sur la protection des infrastructures critiques face aux cybermenaces. La mise en œuvre des programmes de gestion des vulnérabilités, p. ex. le programme de primes aux bogues de la Confédération, et la construction de centres spécialisés en cybersécurité (CSC) dans des secteurs sensibles comme ceux de la santé et du trafic ferroviaire ont permis de réaliser des progrès notables. La création du Cyber Security Hubs (CSH) à l’OFCS a par ailleurs favorisé le développement des échanges d’information concernant les cybermenaces.
En matière de normalisation et de réglementation, les travaux visant à introduire une obligation d’annoncer les cyberattaques contre des infrastructures critiques ont été au premier plan l’année dernière. Cette obligation est entrée en vigueur le 1er avril 2025. Il s’agit de la première réglementation multisectorielle dans le domaine de la cybersécurité.
Dans le domaine de la lutte contre la cybercriminalité, la CSN favorise le développement de capacités spécialisées au sein des autorités de poursuites pénales et le renforcement de la coopération tant au niveau national qu’international. Des plateformes telles que Cyber-CASE et NEDIK permettent une détection et un traitement plus rapides des infractions numériques. Parallèlement, la standardisation des données et des processus ainsi que des formations et perfectionnements ciblés devrait permettre de gagner encore en efficience dans ce domaine à l’avenir.
Au niveau international, la Suisse s’est positionnée activement en faveur de la sécurité dans l’espace numérique. Avec des initiatives comme la Geneva Cyber Week, elle promeut la place internationale de Genève et renforce, en participant au processus de l’ONU et à la Counter Ransomware Initiative, les efforts internationaux visant à établir des règles contraignantes dans le cyberespace.
Computer scientists at ETH Zurich discover new class of vulnerabilities in Intel processors, allowing them to break down barriers between different users of a processor using carefully crafted instruction sequences. Entire processor memory can be read by employing quick, repeated attacks.
All Intel processors since 2018 are affected by Branch Privilege Injection.
In brief
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified a new piece of malware called LOSTKEYS, attributed to the Russian government-backed threat group COLDRIVER (also known as UNC4057, Star Blizzard, and Callisto). LOSTKEYS is capable of stealing files from a hard-coded list of extensions and directories, along with sending system information and running processes to the attacker. Observed in January, March, and April 2025, LOSTKEYS marks a new development in the toolset of COLDRIVER, a group primarily known for credential phishing against high-profile targets like NATO governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and former intelligence and diplomatic officers. GTIG has been tracking COLDRIVER for many years, including their SPICA malware in 2024.
COLDRIVER typically targets high-profile individuals at their personal email addresses or at NGO addresses. They are known for stealing credentials and after gaining access to a target’s account they exfiltrate emails and steal contact lists from the compromised account. In select cases, COLDRIVER also delivers malware to target devices and may attempt to access files on the system.
Recent targets in COLDRIVER’s campaigns have included current and former advisors to Western governments and militaries, as well as journalists, think tanks, and NGOs. The group has also continued targeting individuals connected to Ukraine. We believe the primary goal of COLDRIVER’s operations is intelligence collection in support of Russia’s strategic interests. In a small number of cases, the group has been linked to hack-and-leak campaigns targeting officials in the UK and an NGO.
To safeguard at-risk users, we use our research on serious threat actors like COLDRIVER to improve the safety and security of Google’s products. We encourage potential targets to enroll in Google's Advanced Protection Program, enable Enhanced Safe Browsing for Chrome, and ensure that all devices are updated.
UNC3944, which overlaps with public reporting on Scattered Spider, is a financially-motivated threat actor characterized by its persistent use of social engineering and brazen communications with victims. In early operations, UNC3944 largely targeted telecommunications-related organizations to support SIM swap operations. However, after shifting to ransomware and data theft extortion in early 2023, they impacted organizations in a broader range of industries. Since then, we have regularly observed UNC3944 conduct waves of targeting against a specific sector, such as financial services organizations in late 2023 and food services in May 2024. Notably, UNC3944 has also previously targeted prominent brands, possibly in an attempt to gain prestige and increased attention by news media.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) observed a decline in UNC3944 activity after 2024 law enforcement actions against individuals allegedly associated with the group. Threat actors will often temporarily halt or significantly curtail operations after an arrest, possibly to reduce law enforcement attention, rebuild capabilities and/or partnerships, or shift to new tooling to evade detection. UNC3944’s existing ties to a broader community of threat actors could potentially help them recover from law enforcement actions more quickly.
Recent public reporting has suggested that threat actors used tactics consistent with Scattered Spider to target a UK retail organization and deploy DragonForce ransomware. Subsequent reporting by BBC News indicates that actors associated with DragonForce claimed responsibility for attempted attacks at multiple UK retailers. Notably, the operators of DragonForce ransomware recently claimed control of RansomHub, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) that seemingly ceased operations in March of this year. UNC3944 was a RansomHub affiliate in 2024, after the ALPHV (aka Blackcat) RaaS shut down. While GTIG has not independently confirmed the involvement of UNC3944 or the DragonForce RaaS, over the past few years, retail organizations have been increasingly posted on tracked data leak sites (DLS) used by extortion actors to pressure victims and/or leak stolen victim data. Retail organizations accounted for 11 percent of DLS victims in 2025 thus far, up from about 8.5 percent in 2024 and 6 percent in 2022 and 2023. It is plausible that threat actors including UNC3944 view retail organizations as attractive targets, given that they typically possess large quantities of personally identifiable information (PII) and financial data. Further, these companies may be more likely to pay a ransom demand if a ransomware attack impacts their ability to process financial transactions.
