securityweek.com
ByIonut Arghire| November 24, 2025 (7:14 AM ET)
Spanish flag carrier Iberia is notifying customers that their personal information was compromised after one of its suppliers was hacked.
In Spanish-written emails sent on Sunday, a copy of which threat intelligence provider Hackmanac shared on social media, the company said that names, email addresses, and frequent flyer numbers were stolen in the attack.
According to Iberia, no passwords or full credit card data was compromised in the attack, and the incident was addressed immediately after discovery.
The airline said it also improved customer account protections by requiring a verification code to be provided when attempting to change the email address associated with the account.
Iberia said it has notified law enforcement of the incident and that it has been investigating it together with its suppliers.
The company did not say when the data breach occurred and did not name the third-party supplier that was compromised. It is unclear if the incident is linked to recently disclosed hacking campaigns involving Salesforce and Oracle EBS customers.
It should also be noted that Iberia sent out notifications roughly one week after a threat actor boasted on a hacking forum about having stolen roughly 77 gigabytes of data from the airline’s systems.
The hacker claimed to have stolen ISO 27001 and ITAR-classified information, technical aircraft documentation, engine data, and various other internal documents.
Asking $150,000 for the data, the threat actor was marketing it as suitable for corporate espionage, extortion, or resale to governments.
Founded in 1927, Iberia merged with British Airways in 2011, forming International Airlines Group (IAG), which also owns Aer Lingus, BMI, and Vueling. Iberia currently has an all-Airbus fleet, operating on routes to 130 destinations worldwide.
interestingengineering.com
By Bojan Stojkovski
Nov 23, 2025 02:26 PM EST
A new simulation by Chinese defense researchers suggests that jamming Starlink coverage over an area the size of Taiwan is technically possible.
Instead of focusing on whether Starlink can be jammed in theory, Chinese military planners are increasingly concerned with how such a feat could be attempted in a real conflict over Taiwan. The challenge is staggering: Taiwan and its allies could rely on a constellation of more than 10,000 satellites that hop frequencies, reroute traffic and resist interference in real time.
However, a recent simulation study by Chinese researchers delivers the most detailed public attempt yet to model a potential countermeasure.
Published on November 5 in the peer-reviewed journal Systems Engineering and Electronics, the paper concludes that disrupting Starlink across an area comparable to Taiwan is technically achievable – but only with a massive electronic warfare (EW) force.
Dynamic Starlink network poses major hurdle for EW
Rather than treating Starlink as a static system, Chinese researchers emphasize that its constantly shifting geometry is the real obstacle. In their peer-reviewed study, the team from Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology notes that the constellation’s orbital planes are continuously changing, with satellites moving in and out of view at all times.
This dynamic behavior creates extreme uncertainty for any military attempting to monitor, track or interfere with Starlink’s downlink signals, the South China Morning Post reports. Unlike older satellite networks that depend on a few big geostationary satellites parked over the equator, Starlink behaves nothing like a fixed target.
Traditional systems can be jammed by simply overpowering the signal from the ground, but Starlink changes the equation. Its satellites are low-orbit, fast-moving and deployed by the thousands. A single user terminal never stays linked to just one satellite – it rapidly switches between several, forming a constantly shifting mesh in the sky. As the researchers explain, even if one link is successfully jammed, the connection simply jumps to another within seconds, making interference far harder to sustain.
Distributed jamming swarms seen as the sole viable method
Yang’s research team explains that the only realistic countermeasure would be a fully distributed jamming strategy. Instead of using a few powerful ground stations, an attacker would need hundreds – or even thousands – of small, synchronized jammers deployed in the air on drones, balloons or aircraft. Together, these platforms would form a wide electromagnetic barrier over the combat zone.
The simulation tested realistic jamming by having each airborne jammer broadcast noise at different power levels. Researchers compared wide‑beam antennas that cover more area with less energy to narrow‑beam antennas that are stronger but require precise aiming. For every point on the ground, the model calculated whether a Starlink terminal could still maintain a usable signal.
The Chinese researchers calculated that fully suppressing Starlink over Taiwan, roughly 13,900 square miles, would require at least 935 synchronized jamming platforms, not including backups for failures, terrain interference, or future Starlink upgrades. Using cheaper 23 dBW power sources with spacing of about 3 miles would push the requirement to around 2,000 airborne units, though the team stressed the results remain preliminary since key Starlink anti‑jamming details are still confidential.
