Apple OSes will soon transfer passkeys seamlessly and securely across platforms.
Apple this week provided a glimpse into a feature that solves one of the biggest drawbacks of passkeys, the industry-wide standard for website and app authentication that isn't susceptible to credential phishing and other attacks targeting passwords.
The import/export feature, which Apple demonstrated at this week’s Worldwide Developers Conference, will be available in the next major releases of iOS, macOS, iPadOS, and visionOS. It aims to solve one of the biggest shortcomings of passkeys as they have existed to date. Passkeys created on one operating system or credential manager are largely bound to those environments. A passkey created on a Mac, for instance, can sync easily enough with other Apple devices connected to the same iCloud account. Transferring them to a Windows device or even a dedicated credential manager installed on the same Apple device has been impossible.
Growing pains
That limitation has led to criticisms that passkeys are a power play by large companies to lock users into specific product ecosystems. Users have also rightly worried that the lack of transferability increases the risk of getting locked out of important accounts if a device storing passkeys is lost, stolen, or destroyed.
The FIDO Alliance, the consortium of more than 100 platform providers, app makers, and websites developing the authentication standard, has been keenly aware of the drawback and has been working on programming interfaces that will make the passkey syncing more flexible. A recent teardown of the Google password manager by Android Authority shows that developers are actively implementing import/export tools, although the company has yet to provide any timeline for their general availability. (Earlier this year, the Google password manager added functionality to transfer passwords to iOS apps, but the process is clunky.) A recent update from FIDO shows that a large roster of companies are participating in the development, including Dashlane, 1Password, Bitwarden, Devolutions, NordPass, and Okta.
Researchers revealed on Thursday that two European journalists had their iPhones hacked with spyware made by Paragon. Apple says it has fixed the bug that was used to hack their phones.
The Citizen Lab wrote in its report, shared with TechCrunch ahead of its publication, that Apple had told its researchers that the flaw exploited in the attacks had been “mitigated in iOS 18.3.1,” a software update for iPhones released on February 10.
Until this week, the advisory of that security update mentioned only one unrelated flaw, which allowed attackers to disable an iPhone security mechanism that makes it harder to unlock phones.
On Thursday, however, Apple updated its February 10 advisory to include details about a new flaw, which was also fixed at the time but not publicized.
“A logic issue existed when processing a maliciously crafted photo or video shared via an iCloud Link. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals,” reads the now-updated advisory.
In the final version of its report published Thursday, The Citizen Lab confirmed this is the flaw used against Italian journalist Ciro Pellegrino and an unnamed “prominent” European journalist
It’s unclear why Apple did not disclose the existence of this patched flaw until four months after the release of the iOS update, and an Apple spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment seeking clarity.
The Paragon spyware scandal began in January, when WhatsApp notified around 90 of its users, including journalists and human rights activists, that they had been targeted with spyware made by Paragon, dubbed Graphite.
Then, at the end of April, several iPhone users received a notification from Apple alerting them that they had been the targets of mercenary spyware. The alert did not mention the spyware company behind the hacking campaign.
On Thursday, The Citizen Lab published its findings confirming that two journalists who had received that Apple notification were hacked with Paragon’s spyware.
It’s unclear if all the Apple users who received the notification were also targeted with Graphite. The Apple alert said that “today’s notification is being sent to affected users in 100 countries.”
TCC on macOS isn't just an annoying prompt—it's the last line of defense between malware and your private data. Read this article to learn why.
Lately, I have been reporting many vulnerabilities in third-party applications that allowed for TCC bypass, and I have discovered that most vendors do not understand why they should care. For them, it seems like just an annoying and unnecessary prompt. Even security professionals tasked with vulnerability triage frequently struggle to understand TCC’s role in protecting macOS users’ privacy against malware.
Honestly, I don’t blame them for that because, two years ago, I also didn’t understand the purpose of those “irritating” pop-up notifications. It wasn’t until I started writing malware for macOS. I realized how much trouble an attacker faces because of TCC in actually harming a victim. I wrote this article for Application Developers in mind so that, after reading it, they do not underestimate the vulnerabilities that allow bypassing TCC. It is also intended for Vulnerability Researchers to illustrate an attack vector for further research.
Apple rolls out iOS and macOS platform updates to fix serious security bugs that could be triggered simply by opening an image or video file.
Apple on Monday pushed out patches for security vulnerabilities across the macOS, iPhone and iPad software stack, warning that code-execution bugs that could be triggered simply by opening a rigged image, video or website.
The new iOS 18.5 update, rolled out alongside patches for iPadOS, covers critical bugs in AppleJPEG and CoreMedia with a major warning from Cupertino that attackers could craft malicious media files to run arbitrary code with the privileges of the targeted app.
The company also documented serious file-parsing vulnerabilities patched in CoreAudio, CoreGraphics, and ImageIO, each capable of crashing apps or leaking data if booby-trapped content is opened.
The iOS 18.5 update also provides cover for at least 9 documented WebKit flaws, some serious enough to lead to exploits that allow a hostile website to execute code or crash the Safari browser engine.
The company also patched a serious ‘mute-button’ flaw in FaceTime that exposes the audio conversation even after muting the microphone.
Beneath the interface, Apple said iOS 18.5 hardens the kernel against two memory-corruption issues and cleans up a libexpat flaw (CVE-2024-8176) that affects a broad range of software projects.
Other notable fixes include an issue in Baseband (CVE-2025-31214) that allows attackers in a privileged network position to intercept traffic on the new iPhone 16e line; a privilege escalation bug in mDNSResponder (CVE-2025-31222); an issue in Notes that expose data from a locked iPhone screen; and security gaps in FrontBoard, iCloud Document Sharing, and Mail Addressing.
It's time to update your Macs again! This time, I'm not burying the lede. CVE-2025-31250, which was patched in today's release of macOS Sequoia 15.5, allowed for…
…any Application A to make macOS show a permission consent prompt…
…appearing as if it were coming from any Application B…
…with the results of the user's consent response being applied to any Application C.
These did not have to be different applications. In fact, in most normal uses, they would all likely be the same application. Even a case where Applications B and C were the same but different than Application A would be relatively safe (if somewhat useless from Application A's perspective). However, prior to this vulnerability being patched, a lack of validation allowed for Application B (the app the prompt appears to be from) to be different than Application C (the actual application the user's consent response is applied to).
Spoofing these kinds of prompts is not exactly new. In fact, the HackTricks wiki has had a tutorial on how to perform a similar trick on their site for a while. However, their method requires:
the building of an entire fake app in a temporary directory,
the overriding of a shortcut on the Dock, and
the simple hoping that the user clicks on the (now) fake shortcut.
This vulnerability requires none of the above.
TCC
As I explained in my first ever article on this site, TCC is the core permissions system built into Apple's operating systems. It is used by sending messages to the tccd daemon (or rather, by using functions in the private TCC framework). The framework is a private API, so developers don't call the functions directly (instead, public API's call the functions under-the-hood as needed). However, all this wrapping cannot hide the fact that the control mechanism is still simply sending messages to the daemon.
The daemon uses Apple's public (but proprietary) XPC API for messaging (specifically the lower-level dictionary-based API). Prior to this vulnerability being patched, any app with the ability to send XPC messages to tccd could send it a specifically-crafted message that, as described above, would make it display a permission prompt as if it were from one app but then apply the user's response to a completely separate app. But how was this possible, and was it even hard? Before I answer these questions, we need to detour into what will, at first, seem like a completely unrelated topic.
Millions of Americans have downloaded apps that secretly route their internet traffic through Chinese companies, according to an investigation by the Tech Transparency Project (TTP), including several that were recently owned by a sanctioned firm with links to China’s military.
TTP’s investigation found that one in five of the top 100 free virtual private networks in the U.S. App Store during 2024 were surreptitiously owned by Chinese companies, which are obliged to hand over their users’ browsing data to the Chinese government under the country’s national security laws. Several of the apps traced back to Qihoo 360, a firm declared by the Defense Department to be a “Chinese Military Company." Qihoo did not respond to questions about its app-related holdings.
Apple finally adds TCC events to Endpoint Security!
Since the majority of macOS malware circumvents TCC through explicit user approval, it would be incredibly helpful for any security tool to detect this — and possibly override the user’s risky decision. Until now the best (only?) option was to ingest log messages generated by the TCC subsystem. This approach was implemented in a tool dubbed Kronos, written by Calum Hall Luke Roberts (now, of Phorion fame). Unfortunately, as they note, this approach did have it drawbacks:
In iOS 18, Apple spun off its Keychain password management tool—previously only tucked away in Settings—into a standalone app called...
For the third time in as many months, Apple has released an emergency patch to fix an already exploited zero-day vulnerability impacting a wide range of its products.
The new vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-24201, exists in Apple's WebKit open source browser engine for rendering Web pages in Safari and other apps across macOS, iOS, and iPadOS. WebKit is a frequent target for attackers because of how deeply integrated it is with Apple's ecosystem.
Company will no longer provide its highest security offering in Britain in the wake of a government order to let security officials see protected data.
Apple recently addressed a macOS vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass System Integrity Protection (SIP) and install malicious kernel drivers by loading third-party kernel extensions.
#Apple #Computer #InfoSec #Integrity #Microsoft #Protection #SIP #Security #System #Vulnerability #macOS
Smartphone apps downloaded from Apple and Google can allow parents and other abusers to connect with pedophiles who pay to watch — and direct — criminal behavior.