Cellebrite can apparently extract data from most Pixel phones, unless they’re running GrapheneOS.
Despite being a vast repository of personal information, smartphones used to have little by way of security. That has thankfully changed, but companies like Cellebrite offer law enforcement tools that can bypass security on some devices. The company keeps the specifics quiet, but an anonymous individual recently logged in to a Cellebrite briefing and came away with a list of which of Google’s Pixel phones are vulnerable to Cellebrite phone hacking.
This person, who goes by the handle rogueFed, posted screenshots from the recent Microsoft Teams meeting to the GrapheneOS forums (spotted by 404 Media). GrapheneOS is an Android-based operating system that can be installed on select phones, including Pixels. It ships with enhanced security features and no Google services. Because of its popularity among the security-conscious, Cellebrite apparently felt the need to include it in its matrix of Pixel phone support.
The screenshot includes data on the Pixel 6, Pixel 7, Pixel 8, and Pixel 9 family. It does not list the Pixel 10 series, which launched just a few months ago. The phone support is split up into three different conditions: before first unlock, after first unlock, and unlocked. The before first unlock (BFU) state means the phone has not been unlocked since restarting, so all data is encrypted. This is traditionally the most secure state for a phone. In the after first unlock (AFU) state, data extraction is easier. And naturally, an unlocked phone is open season on your data.
At least according to Cellebrite, GrapheneOS is more secure than what Google offers out of the box. The company is telling law enforcement in these briefings that its technology can extract data from Pixel 6, 7, 8, and 9 phones in unlocked, AFU, and BFU states on stock software. However, it cannot brute-force passcodes to enable full control of a device. The leaker also notes law enforcement is still unable to copy an eSIM from Pixel devices. Notably, the Pixel 10 series is moving away from physical SIM cards.
For those same phones running GrapheneOS, police can expect to have a much harder time. The Cellebrite table says that Pixels with GrapheneOS are only accessible when running software from before late 2022—both the Pixel 8 and Pixel 9 were launched after that. Phones in both BFU and AFU states are safe from Cellebrite on updated builds, and as of late 2024, even a fully unlocked GrapheneOS device is immune from having its data copied. An unlocked phone can be inspected in plenty of other ways, but data extraction in this case is limited to what the user can access.
The original leaker claims to have dialed into two calls so far without detection. However, rogueFed also called out the meeting organizer by name (the second screenshot, which we are not reposting). Odds are that Cellebrite will be screening meeting attendees more carefully now.
We’ve reached out to Google to inquire about why a custom ROM created by a small non-profit is more resistant to industrial phone hacking than the official Pixel OS. We’ll update this article if Google has anything to say.
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