Socket's research uncovers three dangerous Go modules that contain obfuscated disk-wiping malware, threatening complete data loss.
The Go ecosystem, valued for its simplicity, transparency, and flexibility, has exploded in popularity. With over 2 million modules available, developers rely heavily on public repositories like GitHub. However, this openness is precisely what attackers exploit.
No Central Gatekeeping: Developers freely source modules directly from GitHub repositories, trusting the naming conventions implicitly.
Prime Target for Typosquatting: Minimal namespace validation enables attackers to masquerade malicious modules as popular libraries.
Introduction: The Silent Threat#
In April 2025, we detected an attack involving three malicious Go modules which employ similar obfuscation techniques:
github[.]com/truthfulpharm/prototransform
github[.]com/blankloggia/go-mcp
github[.]com/steelpoor/tlsproxy
Despite appearing legitimate, these modules contained highly obfuscated code designed to fetch and execute remote payloads. Socket’s scanners flagged the suspicious behaviors, leading us to a deeper investigation.
Kandji researchers uncovered and disclosed key macOS vulnerabilities over the past year. Learn how we protect customers through detection and patching.
When we discover weaknesses before attackers do, everyone wins. History has shown that vulnerabilities like Gatekeeper bypass and TCC bypass zero-days don't remain theoretical for long—both of these recent vulnerabilities were exploited in the wild by macOS malware. By investing heavily in new security research, we're helping strengthen macOS for everyone.
Once reported to Apple, the fix for these vulnerabilities is not always obvious. Depending on the complexity, it can take a few months to over a year, especially if it requires major architectural changes to the operating system. Apple’s vulnerability disclosure program has been responsive and effective.
Of course, we don't just report issues and walk away. We ensure our products can detect these vulnerabilities and protect our customers from potential exploitation while waiting for official patches.
MCP tools are implicated in several new attack techniques. Here's a look at how they can be manipulated for good, such as logging tool usage and filtering unauthorized commands.
Over the last few months, there has been a lot of activity in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) space, both in terms of adoption as well as security. Developed by Anthropic, MCP has been rapidly gaining traction across the AI ecosystem. MCP allows Large Language Models (LLMs) to interface with tools and for those interfaces to be rapidly created. MCP tools allow for the rapid development of “agentic” systems, or AI systems that autonomously perform tasks.
Beyond adoption, new attack techniques have been shown to allow prompt injection via MCP tool descriptions and responses, MCP tool poisoning, rug pulls and more.
Prompt Injection is a weakness in LLMs that can be used to elicit unintended behavior, circumvent safeguards and produce potentially malicious responses. Prompt injection occurs when an attacker instructs the LLM to disregard other rules and do the attacker’s bidding. In this blog, I show how to use techniques similar to prompt injection to change the LLM’s interaction with MCP tools. Anyone conducting MCP research may find these techniques useful.
The Sysdig Threat Research Team (TRT) has discovered CVE-2025-32955, a now-patched vulnerability in Harden-Runner, one of the most popular GitHub Action CI/CD security tools. Exploiting this vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass Harden-Runner’s disable-sudo security mechanism, effectively evading detection within the continuous integration/continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipeline under certain conditions. To mitigate this risk, users are strongly advised to update to the latest version.
The CVE has been assigned a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.0.
We dive into one of the most sophisticated and impactful ecosystems within the global cybercrime landscape. Our research looks at tools and techniques, specialized forums, popular services, plus a deeply ingrained culture of secrecy and collaboration.
After the release of the Secure Annex ‘Monitor’ feature, I wanted to help evaluate a list of extensions an organization I was working with had configured for monitoring. Notifications when new changes occur is great, but in security, baselines are everything!
To cut down a list of 132 extensions in use, I identified a couple extensions that stuck out because they were ‘unlisted’ in the Chrome Web Store. Unlisted extensions are not indexed by search engines and do not show up when searching the Chrome Web Store. The only way to access the extension is by knowing the URL.
A new NCSC research paper aims to reduce the presence of ‘unforgivable’ vulnerabilities.
Since the end of 2024, we have been continuously monitoring large-scale DDoS attacks orchestrated by an IoT botnet exploiting vulnerable IoT devices such as wireless routers and IP cameras.
Despite both technical exposure by researchers and law enforcement disruption, this infrastructure has remained uncharacteristically consistent, only changing hosting providers. Given the contrasting high level of sophistication between Volt Typhoon’s activity within target organizations and their proxy network, it is possible the KV Botnet is operated by a party other than Volt Typhoon.
In mid-November 2024, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed the Russian threat actor we track as Star Blizzard sending their typical targets spear-phishing messages, this time offering the supposed opportunity to join a WhatsApp group. This is the first time we have identified a shift in Star Blizzard’s longstanding tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to leverage a […]
After the excitement of our .MOBI research, we were left twiddling our thumbs. As you may recall, in 2024, we demonstrated the impact of an unregistered domain when we subverted the TLS/SSL CA process for verifying domain ownership to give ourselves the ability to issue valid and trusted TLS/
In December 2024, two critical vulnerabilities in Microsoft's Windows Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) were addressed via Microsoft’s monthly Patch Tuesday release. Both vulnerabilities were deemed as highly significant due to the widespread use of LDAP in Windows environments:
CVE-2024-49112: A remote code execution (RCE) bug that attackers can exploit by sending specially crafted LDAP requests, allowing them to execute arbitrary code on the target system.
CVE-2024-49113: A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability that can be exploited to crash the LDAP service, leading to service disruptions.
In this blog entry, we discuss a fake proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2024-49113 (aka LDAPNightmare) designed to lure security researchers into downloading and executing information-stealing malware.
A sudden disruption of a major phishing-as-a-service provider leads to the rise of another…that looks very familiar
In this research, we uncovered several vulnerabilities and security flaws within the Prometheus ecosystem. These findings span across three major areas: information disclosure, denial-of-service (DoS), and code execution. We found that exposed Prometheus servers or exporters, often lacking proper authentication, allowed attackers to easily gather sensitive information, such as credentials and API keys.
Additionally, we identified an alarming risk of DoS attacks stemming from the exposure of pprof debugging endpoints, which, when exploited, could overwhelm and crash Prometheus servers, Kubernetes pods and other hosts.
Oasis Security's research team uncovered a critical vulnerability in Microsoft's Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) implementation, allowing attackers to bypass it and gain unauthorized access to the user’s account, including Outlook emails, OneDrive files, Teams chats, Azure Cloud, and more. Microsoft has more than 400 million paid Office 365 seats, making the consequences of this vulnerability far-reaching.
The bypass was simple: it took around an hour to execute, required no user interaction and did not generate any notification or provide the account holder with any indication of trouble.
The team at CYFIRMA analyzed a malicious Android sample designed to target high-value assets in Southern Asia. This sample, attributed to an unknown threat actor, was generated using the Spynote Remote Administration Tool. While the specifics of the targeted asset remain confidential, it is likely that such a target would attract the interest of APT groups. However, we are restricted from disclosing further details about the actual target and its specific region. For a comprehensive analysis, please refer to the detailed report
Since February 2024, the World Watch Cyber Threat Intelligence team has been working on an extensive study of the private and public relationships within the Chinese cyber offensive ecosystem. This includes:
We often trust our security software to stand as an unbreakable wall against malware and attacks, but what happens when that very wall is weaponized against us? Our Trellix Advanced Research Center team recently uncovered a malicious campaign that does just that. Instead of bypassing defenses, this malware takes a more sinister route: it drops a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit driver (aswArPot.sys) and manipulates it to carry out its destructive agenda. The malware exploits the deep access provided by the driver to terminate security processes, disable protective software, and seize control of the infected system.
