Adam Griffin is still in disbelief over how quickly he was robbed of nearly $500,000 in cryptocurrencies. A scammer called using a real Google phone number to warn his Gmail account was being hacked, sent email security alerts directly from…
ConnectOnCall.com, LLC provides a product (“ConnectOnCall”) that healthcare providers purchase to improve their after-hours call process and enhance communications between the providers and their patients. ConnectOnCall discovered an incident that involved personal information related to communications between patients and healthcare providers that use ConnectOnCall.
On May 12, 2024, ConnectOnCall learned of an issue impacting ConnectOnCall and immediately began an investigation and took steps to secure the product and ensure the overall security of its environment. ConnectOnCall’s investigation revealed that between February 16, 2024, and May 12, 2024, an unknown third party had access to ConnectOnCall and certain data within the application, including certain information in provider-patient communications.
Guardio Labs tracked and analyzed a large-scale fake captcha campaign distributing a disastrous Lumma info-stealer malware that circumvents general security measures like Safe Browsing. Entirely reliant on a single ad network for propagation, this campaign showcases the core mechanisms of malvertising — delivering over 1 million daily “ad impressions” and causing thousands of daily victims to lose their accounts and money through a network of 3,000+ content sites funneling traffic. Our research dissects this campaign and provides insights into the malvertising industry’s infrastructure, tactics, and key players.
Through a detailed analysis of redirect chains, obfuscated scripts, and Traffic Distribution Systems (TDS) — in collaboration with our friends at Infoblox — we traced the campaign’s origins to Monetag, a part of ProepllerAds’ network previously tracked by Infoblox under the name “Vane Viper.” Further investigation reveals how threat actors leveraged services like BeMob ad-tracking to cloak their malicious intent, showcasing the fragmented accountability in the ad ecosystem. This lack of oversight leaves internet users vulnerable and enables malvertising campaigns to flourish at scale.
I just wanted to make you all aware of what happened over the weekend.
On Sunday afternoon, Harry Sintonenen made us aware that several security
related websites posted articles about the "CRITICAL curl security flaw".
We announced that as severity LOW earlier this week. How and why did this
massive severiy level bump happen?
An “international cybercriminal group” harvested the personal data of potentially hundreds of thousands of people from the state’s social services and health insurance systems, officials said.
In this research, we uncovered several vulnerabilities and security flaws within the Prometheus ecosystem. These findings span across three major areas: information disclosure, denial-of-service (DoS), and code execution. We found that exposed Prometheus servers or exporters, often lacking proper authentication, allowed attackers to easily gather sensitive information, such as credentials and API keys.
Additionally, we identified an alarming risk of DoS attacks stemming from the exposure of pprof debugging endpoints, which, when exploited, could overwhelm and crash Prometheus servers, Kubernetes pods and other hosts.
Akamai security researcher Tomer Peled explored new ways to use and abuse Microsoft's UI Automation framework and discovered an attack technique that evades endpoint detection and response (EDR).
To exploit this technique, a user must be convinced to run a program that uses UI Automation. This can lead to stealthy command execution, which can harvest sensitive data, redirect browsers to phishing websites, and more.
Detection of this technique is challenging in several ways, including for EDR. All EDR technologies we have tested against this technique were unable to find any malicious activity.
This technique can be used on every Windows endpoint with operating system XP and above.
In this blog post, we provide a full write-up on how to (ab)use the UI Automation framework (including possible attacks that could leverage it) and we present a proof of concept (PoC) for each abuse vector we discuss. We also provide detection and mitigation options.